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“Send Forward Some Who Would Fight”: How John T. Wilder and His “Lightning
Brigade” of Mounted Infantry Changed Warfare
I. Introduction
Warfare often involves innovation and problem solving. Eventually, certain tactics and
technology reach the limits of their usefulness or effectiveness, resulting in stalemate and
ineffectiveness. This problem is often overcome when someone invents a solution on the fly.
Military history is replete with examples of units, or individuals, developing innovative ways to
overcome problems they faced, either through raw innovation or by simply using existing tools
in a distinctive way. Brigadier General John Thomas Wilder was one such individual.
Faced with the continued frustration of having to pursue some of the best Confederate
cavalry commanders on foot, Wilder made a push that would culminate in an original, though in
hindsight obvious, solution. 1 His 17th Indiana Volunteer Infantry Regiment, as well as the rest of
his brigade, would be placed on horseback and equipped with the best weapons possible for the
time. 2 Wilder’s intention was to make the brigade more effective against the cavalry units he was
charged with locating, but it quickly became more than that. The 17th Indiana Volunteer Infantry
Regiment, under Brigadier General (Brevet) John T. Wilder, was part of what became known as
the “Lightning Brigade”, a mounted infantry brigade consisting of several infantry regiments that
altered existing warfare methods. The unit’s use of horses and mules to position for combat and
its being equipped with Spencer Repeating Rifles rather than muskets, while still being trained to
fight as infantrymen rather than cavalry, was a radical change in warfare. The point of this
project is to prove that John T. Wilder, and by extension his “Lightning Brigade”, made a

Richard A. Baumgartner, Blue Lightning: Wilder’s Mounted Infantry Brigade in the Battle of Chickamauga.
(Huntington: Blue Acorn Press, 1997), 37.
2
Ibid, 37.
1
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conscious decision to develop a unique fighting method, one that proved effective against
outdated Napoleonic tactics. Not only were these changes effective, they had great effect on
warfare, even if they would not be recognized as such at the time.
II. Historiography and Methods
From a historiographical perspective, my thesis will be from the standpoint of military
history. While the unit’s demographics will be examined to give a better understanding of the
men who made up the 17th Indiana and the rest of the Lightning Brigade, and to see if the
different cultural contributions had an effect on the unit’s high morale as well as to test whether
their demographics were typical or unique, the key focus will be the military tactical changes
made and whether or not such changes were original, effective, and transformative. To help find
evidence for this argument, the sources that I will focus on most will be primary sources,
specifically diaries, letters, unit histories, and military tactical manuals.
Diaries are the best source for any sort of historical research, as they offer first-hand
accounts, their respective viewpoints, and often thoughts on historical figures who are otherwise
thought to be above reproach. They also give a grimmer, more honest view of the various battles
immediately or even as they were fought, than later “official” accounts. The lack of a broad view
of the various conflicts is minimally important as the grand scope of a particular battle is
secondary to the unit’s contribution to it. While often the diarists’ military observations are
vague or undeveloped, as these were entirely volunteers and not career military men, they still
give important accounts on the changes in which the Brigade was involved from a layman’s
perspective.
The next important source is soldiers’ letters, the men’s only contact with family and
friends back home. While often written several days after the battles, and usually lacking context
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of the responding letter or the letter that came to the soldiers prior to their writing the letter being
sent, they were often more thoughtful and detailed about military goings-on. Perhaps this was
because they realized their audience knew little to nothing about military life, the places they
were visiting or the problems they faced on a day-to-day basis. Their letters were often the best
source of news to their local communities, and they frequently provided more detailed accounts
of the unit’s actions as well as the armies to which they were a part. Arguably there could be a
danger of exaggeration and embellishment, but such issues are easy enough to pinpoint with
official accounts and accounts from other men present. The fact that the letters are generally
longer and more detailed than diary entries is also a benefit.
Probably the most helpful source for information on a particular unit are the unit
histories. Evidently, it was not only common for units to publish histories of their exploits, as
was the case for most of the “Lightning Brigade” 3, the 17th Indiana actually had two published,
by different men, and published literature from their various unit associations long after the war.
While it is apparent that reusing another’s work without mentioning them (plagiarism) was not
uncommon, each history contains unique information and provides additional background and
evidence. They also contain letters, written by unit members after the war, detailing their
memories of the battles, skirmishes, even in one instance giving resolution to what exactly
happened to the 17th’s battle flag after its capture by the enemy at the Battle of Munfordsville,
1862. 4

3

Due to the number of the various supporting units important to the examination of Lightning Brigade, I only
examined the various unit histories of the 17th.
4
W. H. H. Benefiel, Souvenir- The Seventeenth Indiana Regiment. A History From its Organization to the End of the
War: Giving Descriptions of Battles, Etc. Section: Battle of Munfordville. (Call number E506.4 C5 fiche nos. 202-203.
Pendleton, IN: WHH Benefiel, 1913. Indiana Historical Society Library Microfilm Collection), 3.
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The final primary sources that will be key to the argument of examining the effect the
17th and the “Lightning Brigade” had on military doctrine and warfare are military tactical
manuals from the periods before, during and after the American Civil War. Example’s like
“Hardee’s United States Infantry and Rifle Tactics” printed before the war, “Revised System of
Cavalry Tactics for the use of Cavalry and Mounted Infantry, C.S.A.” by Major-General Joseph
Wheeler (CSA) during the war, and “A New System of Infantry Tactics, Double and Single
Rank; Adapted to American Topography and Improved Firearms” by Major-General Emory
Upton post-Civil War give an excellent view of not only how the various armies thought they
would be fighting the struggle, but what they actually learned after four bloody years of
conflict. 5 While I used others sources, secondary and primary, my goal was to base my argument
on as much primary documentation as possible.
My examination of the “Lighting Brigade” seeks to prove four things with regard to the
Brigade: that the changes made were deliberate; that the changes made were effective; that they
were noticed by men within and without the units; and that these changes effected military
tactics in the future. The evidence shows clearly, I argue, just where the Lightning Brigade fits in
the annals of the Civil War. The organization of the thesis will focus on the Wilder Brigade’s
effectiveness. After surveying the unit’s history, presenting the decision to mount, the men’s
individual backgrounds and the background of Wilder himself, we can examine how the units
viewed these changes, how their allies in the Union army viewed them, what the Confederates
who fought them thought of these “Mounted Infantry”, and finally, how their tactics were used

Numerous secondary sources back these up: United States Infantry and Rifle Tactics (Hardee’s) War Department
1861 (Reprint. South Carolina: B&B Historical Research, 1985), Emory Upton, A New System of Infantry Tactics
Double and Single Rank Adapted to American Topography and Improved Fire-Arms (New York: Appleton, 1867),
and Joseph Wheeler, Revised System of Cavalry Tactics For The Use Of The Cavalry and Mounted Infantry, C.S.A.
(Mobile: S.H. Gortzel & Co., 1863)

5
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after the war. Analysis of these factors should prove that the unit made great strides in modern
warfare tactics, while shattering notions about their methods and the doubts of the weapons they
carried.
III. The term “Mounted Infantry” and Word Vectors
When word reached the 72nd Indiana Volunteer Infantry Regiment that they would be
mounted, Alva C. Griest wrote in his diary, “We are to fight as infantry, but are to do all our
marching on horseback. On some accounts I like it, on some others I dislike it” 6. To most
observers this would seem a contradictory statement; how can infantry “marching on horseback”
be infantry, for would they not be cavalry? This contradiction in terms is the first issue that needs
to be explained before the story of Wilder and the Lightning Brigade can be analyzed.
First, we need to look at just what the term “Mounted Infantry” tells us, both about the
unit, their skill set, and the men making it up as well as about the expectations they faced on their
actual functions. By utilizing “the vectors of soldier-words”, advanced by Professor Stephen
Morillo, we can better break down and emphasize why this designation tells us so much about
the unit and why they are not simply another unit of cavalry. 7 Morillo writes, “…what we see
depends crucially on the words we use”, and there are few places where that is more true than
with Wilder’s Brigade. 8 The theory attempts to explain and bridge the gap between descriptions
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Alva C. Griest, Collection 1862-1865. Call Number SC 0656 Folders 1-3. Bib Number 36486. (Indiana Historical
Society Library Manuscript Collection), 62.
7
Stephen Morillo, “Milites, Knights, and Samurai: Military Terminology, Comparative History, and the Problem of
Translation.” in B. Bachrach and R. Abels, eds., The Normans and their Adversaries at War: Essays in Honor of C.
Warren Hollister (Boydell and Brewer: 2001), 170, 167-172. This theory perfectly illustrates why mounted infantry
is such a novel term and is important to any discussion about Wilder’s Lightning Brigade. I would take it further to
explain why exactly the term ‘mounted infantry” and “dismounted cavalry”, when used correctly, but conjure
images of similar things.
8
Ibid, 167.
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of different cultures and languages of military men and units with three different “vectors of
soldier-words”: Functional, Organizational, and Social. 9
Functional word vectors refer to, “…how soldiers perform some military function…”
with the broad categories being infantry or cavalry, but these classifications can be further
broken up into specialties, like artillerymen or “pioneers”. 10 This first distinction should
permanently label the Wilder Brigade as infantry, as that was the unit they all joined at the war’s
onset. However, another function the brigade performed was movement on horseback, a valuable
strategic asset. But even though they could perform the function of a “mounted” unit, the
expectation was that they were still performing infantry duties. The term “mounted infantry”
encompasses both of their functions as a unit while also taking into account the expectation that
they are still infantry. So while they are not “true” infantry, they are still closer to infantry than
cavalry due to their own expectations.
This brings us to the second category, which has to do with organizational word vectors,
“…a unit of soldiers in terms of their usual or “standard” mode of operation…” which is set by
the organization to which a particular unit is a part. 11 It is this definition that Morillo brings up
the Brigade, specifically the 17th and 72nd Indiana Mounted Infantry Regiments, to demonstrate
his point that while they are described as “mounted”, they are defined by how they are organized,
which, according to the United States Army, was as “infantry”. 12 So a functional vector refers to
how they generally fight (mounted and on foot) and the organizational vector refers to how they
are organized to fight (as infantry). 13 This makes the idea of “Mounted Infantry” meaningless

9

Morillo, “Milites, Knights, and Samurai”, 170-171.
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from an organizational standpoint, yet perfectly describes their dual functional duties (as well as
being a self-prescribed label), while as an organizational vector they remain “institutionally”
assigned as infantry. 14
While not consistent through all sources, many including (more importantly) official
sources like the National Park Service guide on the “Chickamauga and Chattanooga Battlefields”
make the distinction between “Minty’s Cavalry” and “Wilder’s Mounted Infantry” 15. It would be
simple enough to discount as the writer James R. Sullivan likely was referring to the brigade as
they referred to themselves, but if they were interchangeable, wouldn’t they have saved the paper
space and put in ‘Cavalry’ instead? Such wording suggests that because the organization of the
Brigade remained infantry, it was necessary to refer to them as such.
Another example of this would be a scholarly collection of works on the campaigns in
Kentucky and Tennessee in the middle part of the war (1862-1864); here the former officer H. V.
Boynton refers to multiple cavalry units but then describes the actions of “Wilder’s mounted
infantry” above Chattanooga. 16 An educated military man like Boynton, former LieutenantColonel in the 35th Ohio Volunteers, was also apt to make the distinction because of the differing
functional actions and expectations of a unit like Wilder’s Brigade.
Finally, the editor of the book “Morning to Midnight in the Saddle: Civil War Letters of a
Soldier in Wilder’s Lightning Brigade”, points out that the 123rd Illinois Volunteer Infantry
Regiment was a part of an “Elite unit of mounted infantry”, thus further discounting the idea of

14

Morillo, “Milites, Knights, and Samurai”, 170-171.
James R. Sullivan, Chickamauga and Chattanooga: Battlefields (Washington DC: National Park Service, 1956), 15.
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dismounted cavalry and mounted infantry being interchangeable terms in any way. 17 This
difference across these and many other sources shows that the distinction being made is more
than just words, and has more to do with the word vectors of the terms and what they imply
about the units, both from a functional and organizational standpoint. Despite the meaning that
can be inferred from the term “mounted infantry”, its origins are entirely social, which carries
with it certain inferences about who made up the unit.
The final word vector is the social vector which refers to separation of soldiers by “class
rather than function”, meaning the vector has more to do with self-perception and labelling than
with any other factor. 18 While this distinction of class would be less pronounced in the Civil War
era than, say, the medieval era, it still comes into play more acutely when discussing a unit like
Wilder’s Lightning Brigade of Mounted Infantry. In addition, the social vector, mounted infantry
units vs. cavalry units, also denotes their different training and background. The class divide I
refer to is the description of the men making up Southern cavalry units vs. the men making up
Northern mounted infantry units like Wilder’s Brigade. Southern cavalry units were described by
General William T. Sherman as, “The young bloods of the South: sons of planters, lawyers about
towns, good billiard-players and sportsmen, men who never did work and never will. War suits
them, and the rascals are brave, fine riders bold to rashness and dangerous subjects in every
sense” 19. In short, an upper-class aristocracy, which neatly sums up Sherman’s views on cavalry
in general as those who believe themselves “above” others, something that likely perturbed
Midwesterners like Sherman, Wilder and their men. While some Southern Generals were like
Nathan Bedford Forrest, whose men were described as “…some of the best mounted infantry of

Christopher D. McManus, Thomas H Ingalls, and Otho James Hicks, eds. Morning to Midnight in the Saddle: Civil
War Letters of a Soldier in Wilder's Lightning Brigade. (US: McManus, Inglis, Hicks, 2012), 11.
18
Ibid, 171.
19
H. C. B. Rogers, The Confederates and Federals at War (Pennsylvania: Combined Publishing, 2000), 49.
17
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the war”, others were like General J.E.B. Stuart, who seemed, “…to have had little interest in his
men as mounted infantry” 20. Conversely, Wilder’s men are described as “active, rough-andready men” who “always wanted something to do,” part of the typical “farm boys” that
populated the Western Union armies, quite a change from the gallivanting cavaliers of a typical
cavalry unit. 21 Nothing emphasizes this social difference from cavalrymen more than the actions
of the men in the Brigade; upon receiving their new cavalry uniforms, all the men promptly
removed the “yellow-piping”, “Cavalry trim” or “cavalry yellow” to distinguish themselves from
the regular cavalry they had no affinity with, as their time in the infantry had instilled in them a
poor view of such men. 22 The social vector of the word “mounted infantry” would seem then to
mean a great deal to the men in the unit, because not only did they see themselves as unique and
new, but because they truly were a different entity down to their very equipment. 23 24
The term mounted infantry, then, would seem to be entirely a social construct, a selfprescribed title to make clear to all others (and themselves) that they were not the aristocratic
cavaliers of the Southern cavalry that they loathed, but rather a new and unique force still firmly
rooted in the working classes from which they all came.
When it came down to it, dismounted cavalry were not synonymous with infantry, and
mounted infantry were not the same as cavalry. They entered combat with a different mindset

Joseph G. Bilby, Civil War Firearms: Their Historical Background, Tactical Use and Modern Collecting and
Shooting (Conshohocken, PA: Combined Publishing, 1999), 144.
21
Claire E. Swedberg, Ed. Three Years with the 92nd Illinois: The Civil War Diary of John M. King (Mechanicsburg:
Stackpole Books, 1999), 101, and Glenn W. Sunderland, Lightning at Hoover’s Gap: Wilder’s Brigade in the Civil
War. (New York: Thomas Yoseluff, 1969), 11.
22
Baumgartner, Blue Lightning, 57, McManus, Morning to Midnight in the Saddle, 69, John C. McQueen, Spencer:
The First Effective and Widely Used Repeating Rifle and Its Use in the Western Theatre of the Civil War (Columbus,
GA: Communicorp, 1989), 44, John W. Rowell, Yankee Artillerymen: Through the Civil War with Eli Lilly’s Indiana
Battery (Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press, 1975), 61, and Sunderland, Lightning at Hoover’s Gap, 26.
23
Baumgartner, Blue Lightning, 57, McQueen, Spencer, 44, and Rowell, Yankee Artillerymen, 61.
24
Aside from the different uniforms, the standard cavalryman carried sabers and pistols, Wilder’s men had rifles
and Hatchets (due to training deficiency concern), though some self-equipped with pistols. See above for citation.
20
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and training background and socially they were not the same. While Cavalry units used horses as
the source of identity, the men of Wilder’s mounted infantry saw their mounts from an entirely
utilitarian perspective. The mounts simply allowed them to perform better as infantrymen. Their
label of “mounted infantry” was self-prescribed (social) and referred to their functional duties.
Therefore, the key part of their designation came from their organizational assignment, and,
despite the changing methods and missions they were given, the army continued to organize
them as infantry.
Now that we have a point of reference to what exactly “mounted infantry” refers to, we
can discuss the history of the various regiments that made up Wilder’s Lightning Brigade.
IV. The Regiments: Their Histories and The Brigade’s Finest Moments
Wilder’s Lightning Brigade was comprised of a number of infantry regiments and one
artillery battery during its service from inception to the end of the Civil War. The units
considered to be the “core” members of the Brigade were the 17th Indiana Volunteer Infantry
Regiment, the 72nd Indiana Volunteer Infantry Regiment, the 98th Illinois Volunteer Infantry
Regiment and the 123rd Illinois Volunteer Infantry Regiment, with the 18th Indiana Battery added
during the campaign leading-up to and just after the Battle of Chickamauga. 25 Other units to pass
through the brigade included the 75th Indiana Volunteer Infantry Regiment, who left several
months after Wilder took command due to voting against mounting their men, and the 92nd
Illinois Volunteer Infantry Regiment, who were “temps” and often pulled away from the Brigade
during the Chattanooga campaign until they were permanently assigned to another unit shortly
thereafter. 26 Other units fought with the brigade officially on a number of occasions such as Col.
Robert H. G. Minty and his Cavalry Brigade, with whom Wilder and his brigade stood shoulder

25
26

Sunderland, Lightning at Hoover’s Gap, 18.
Ibid, 17.
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to shoulder at Chickamauga and fought repeatedly with during the Atlanta campaign and Wilson
Raid till the end of the war. 27 Others, like the 39th Indiana Volunteer Infantry Regiment (later the
8th Indiana Cavalry 28) under Colonel Thomas J. Harrison, were another mounted infantry unit
equipped with Spencer repeating rifles who had their moment side-by-side the Lightning Brigade
for the brief but crucial hours on the second day of the Battle of Chickamauga. 29 These units,
however distinguished and storied their respective histories, are outside the scope of this paper as
they never joined in the Brigade’s effort at innovation, even if they came up with unique tactics
of their own. That said, it is important to give brief histories of the various brigade members to
get a context of their experience during the war. The 17th IN, 72nd IN, 98th IL, and 123rd IL will
be considered the “core” units of the Brigade, while the 92nd IL and the 18th IN Battery will be
considered “supporting” members.
The 17th Indiana Volunteer Infantry Regiment (later the 17th Indiana Mounted Infantry
Regiment) was authorized on May 3rd, 1861, and formed (mustered in) for service June 12th,
1861 under Colonel Milo S. Hascall. 30 Hascall served as regimental commander from June 4th,
1861 until March 25th, 1862; other regimental commanders included John T. Wilder from March
27th, 1862 until October 5th, 1864 and Jacob C. Vail from November 18th, 1864 until the end of
the war. 31 The regiment proudly attested that they served in nearly every state of the South east
of the Mississippi and that the unit had, “Every county represented in the State, 20 other states,

Glenn Tucker, Chickamauga: Bloody Battle in the West (New York: Konecky & Konecky, 1961), 16, 112, and
Sunderland, Lightning at Hoover’s Gap, 139-210. (Campaign history after the beginning of 1864 made with Minty
nearby, though they were always distinct units and did not share any kind of tactics on the battlefield, each had
their part).
28
Turned into cavalry regiment when they were transferred under the command of General Hugh Judson “KillCavalry” Kilpatrick’ cavalry brigade during the “March to the Sea”.
29
Baumgartner, Blue Lightning, 283-289, and Joseph G. Bilby, "The Guns of 1865: The Spencer Comes Of Age." in
The American Rifleman, Vol.163, No.3 (March 2015): 58.
30
William E. Doyle, A History of the Seventeenth Indiana from its Organization to the End of the War. (Indianapolis:
Holloway, Douglas & Co., 1865), 1, and Arville L. Funk, Hoosiers in the Civil War. (Chicago: Adams Press, 1967), 168.
31
Doyle, A History of the Seventeenth Indiana, 29.
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almost every country in Europe” within the ranks of the 17th. 32 Further attention will be brought
to this point later as many other units not only came from very small geographic areas
(relatively) but took pride in being free from “foreign influences”. Prior to joining the Brigade,
the 17th IN fought at Fort Greenbrier, VA (now WV) during the Battle of Greenbrier (or Fort
Greenbrier depending on the source) on October 3rd, 1861, before being transferred west to what
would be their rendezvous with history. 33 The unit could claim two Medal of Honor winners:
Private John Davis, Co. F from Marion County and Private Aaron Hudson from LaPorte County,
and collected an impressive number of war trophies in the form of Regimental colors that they
captured on the field of battle. 34 They also proudly proclaimed, “We boast of having
accomplished more with the least loss of life than any other regiment in the service”. 35 This is
truly an amazing claim. In addition, two members of the brigade had encounters with historical
figures of note during their campaigning: Sergeant J. J. Weller, Co. E, shot an enemy Colonel
while on a scouting mission in West Virginia, 1861, a Colonel who turned out to be Col. John A.
Washington, descendant of George Washington and Chief of Staff to General Robert E. Lee;
Captain James A. Taylor, Co. G, nearly killed General Nathaniel Bedford Forrest during a brash
charge at the Battle of Ebenezer’s Church April 1st, 1865, and though Capt. Taylor was killed in
the fight, the General commented later at a flag of truce that, “If that boy had known enough to
give me the point of his saber instead of the edge, I should not have been here to tell you about
it”, still with his arm in a sling from the severe injuries sustained. 36 Despite their confidence and

Doyle, A History of the Seventeenth Indiana, 1.
Benefiel, Souvenir, 3, W H. H. Benefiel, Seventeenth Regiment Indiana Veteran Volunteer Mounted Infantry:
Roster of Surviving Member and Sketch of History. (Call Number E506.4 C5 fiche no. 201. Pendleton, IN: 17th
Indiana Regimental Association, 1912. Indiana Historical Society Library Microfilm Collection), “Three Year Service”,
1, and Doyle, A History of the Seventeenth Indiana, 6-7.
34
Funk, Hoosiers in the Civil War, 111, and Benefiel, Seventeenth Regiment, 9.
35
Benefiel, Seventeenth Regiment, 9.
36
Benefiel, Souvenir, “Personal Encounters”, 1, and Sunderland, Lightning at Hoover’s Gap, 200.
32
33
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proud accomplishments, the “boss unit” 37 of the Lightning Brigade needed equally motivated
support. Their fellow Hoosiers that made up this support included the members of the 72nd
Indiana Mounted Infantry Regiment.
The 72nd Indiana Volunteer Infantry Regiment was the other Hoosier unit in the
Lightning Brigade. Authorized on July 7th, 1862, they were formed on August 16th, 1862, with
Colonel Chris Miller commanding, who would serve in the post until he was given permanent
command of the Brigade in June 1864. 38 They were organized and the unit was raised in the “8th
Congressional District” of which Lafayette was a part and where the unit was mustered in at. 39
Prior to joining the Brigade, they had spent a great deal of their time skirmishing with General
Braxton Bragg’ forces in Kentucky before moving on to Tennessee where they began their
service as mounted infantry. 40 Alva C. Griest, a Quaker from Crawfordsville, IN, kept a diary
that chronicled the unit’s history from his enlistment until the war’s end. This was unique, as the
author notes, due to the fact that he wrote of the events as they happened and he did not make
changes later to correct his narrative. 41 It was noted that during their garrison duty at Macon,
GA, they nearly captured Jefferson Davis, former President of the then defunct Confederate
States of America, and did have him there briefly while they manned provost duty at the end of
the war. 42 They then mustered out in Indianapolis on June 26th, 1865, short nearly half the
number they had begun with. 43 The 72nd IN was with the Brigade for most of its major actions
and the 72nd IN’s men often found themselves in the thick of battle at key moments. Hoosier

Swedberg, Ed. Three Years with the 92nd Illinois, 105.
Funk, Hoosiers in the Civil War, 169 and Sunderland, Lightning at Hoover’s Gap, 151.
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Griest, Collection, “Historical Sketch”, 1.
40
Ibid, “Historical Sketch” 1.
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Ibid, “Forward”, “Historical Sketch”, 1.
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Ibid, “Historical Sketch”, 3.
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units alone did not make up the entirety of the Brigade as Illinois provided the other half of the
elite unit.
The 98th Illinois Volunteer Infantry Regiment was the first of two Illinois regiments that
formed the “core” Lightening Brigade regiments. Organized on September 3rd 1862 in Centralia,
IL (southern Illinois), under Colonel John J. Funkhouser, the regiment’s first taste of war
involved a train derailment that was probably the result of sabotage, killing 8 and injuring 75
men, before they marched the rest of the way to Frankfort, KY, to participate in a feint during the
Perryville Campaign. 44 This however covered the extent of their combat experience during their
4 months of service, having been mustered in only several months prior to their joining the
Brigade. 45 They also had the distinction of being the only unit of the Brigade equipped with
“imported Austrian muskets” while other units mostly had Springfield rifles, underscoring the
difficulty of matching equipment alone presented the brigade. Following the end of the war, they
were mustered out on June 27th, 1865, having proudly served with the Brigade for almost the
entire war. 46 Their sister Illinois unit served beside them with equal distinction.
The 123rd Illinois Volunteer Infantry Regiment nearly failed to join the Brigade, but they
ended up as a replacement regiment following the 75th Indiana failing to vote in favor of
Wilder’s mounting scheme. 47 The 123rd spent a good deal of time “subbing” for the 75th with the
Lightning Brigade before joining according to then Sergeant Otho McManus of the 123rd, Co. G,
before their incorporation was official. 48 Recruited and mustered at Mustoon, IL (central
Illinois), Sept 6th, 1862, under Colonel James Monroe, they fought about one month later at the

Sunderland, Lightning at Hoover’s Gap, 151.
Baumgartner, Blue Lightning, 26-28.
46
Ken Baumann, Arming the Suckers, 1861-1865: A Compilation of Illinois Civil War Weapons (Milan, MI:
Morningside, 1989), 186.
47
Baumgartner, Blue Lightning, 70.
48
McManus, Morning to Midnight in the Saddle, 48.
44
45

15

Battle of Perryville, where they suffered a great number of casualties due to their lack of
experience despite giving a good account for such a green unit. 49 They later participated in the
Battle of Vaught’s Hill during March 1863, where they again gave a good account of themselves,
where they inflicted far more casualties then they suffered. 50 Soon after they were officially
brought into Wilder’s brigade and equipped accordingly. 51 After their service with the Brigade
for the remainder of the war, they were mustered out on June 27th, 1865. 52
These “Core” regiments make up what would be referred to from June 1863 until the end
of the war as “Wilder’s Lightning Brigade”, but there were other who contributed to this famous
brigade’s legend. One of these “Supporting” units, the 92nd Illinois Volunteer Infantry Regiment,
figured extensively at the most famous Lightning Brigade battle, the Battle of Chickamauga,
while the 18th Indiana Battery under Captain Eli Lilly contributed heavily to all actions the
Brigade was involved in from Hoover’s Gap until just after the Battle of Chickamauga. Both
units are important to the history of the Brigade, but were not with the brigade throughout its
service.
The 92nd IL was mustered in on September 4th, 1862, with Colonel Smith D. Atkins
commanding, and was transferred to the Wilder Brigade following a concerted effort to be
assigned a different unit to get away from the reserve corps command under General Granger,
finally succeeding in July of 1863. 53 They served with the Lightning Brigade throughout the
Chattanooga Campaign that culminated with the Battle of Chickamauga, though they often were
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selected for alternative duties and away from the Brigade. 54 An effort to retain their Spencer
rifles after General H. J. Kilpatrick threatened to remove them resulted not only in him being
impressed by their demonstration of its effectiveness, but altering his views on the weapon and
incorporating their regiment into one of his Brigades during the famous “March to the Sea”
where Gen. “Kill-Cavalry” Kilpatrick utilized tactics similar to the ones demonstrated so
effectively by the Lightning Brigade during the march with the 92nd IL, the 8th Indiana Cavalry
(formerly 39th Indiana Infantry), the 46th OH and the 66th IL to great acclaim. 55 The regiment was
eventually mustered out on June 21st, 1865, ending their distinguished service. 56
Finally, the 18th Indiana Battery under Captain Eli Lilly mustered in at Indianapolis on
July 7th, 1862. 57 The dynamic Capt. Lilly and the Lilly Battery were attached to Brigade on Dec
24th of that year, and served with them until “The Split” of the Brigade for several months from
the end of November 1863 until April 1864. 58 During their tenure, the Lilly Battery served with
distinction and often received commendation alongside Wilder. 59 Lilly also equipped his battery
with 6-inch Rodman guns and several mountain howitzers that were lighter and could better keep
pace with the fast moving mounted infantry, an early example of what modern military forces
call combine combat arms. 60 Due to the lack of work for the battery during raids, they often
found themselves acting as foragers in support of the brigade. 61 A great contributor to the
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Brigade’s success both at Hoover’s Gap and Chickamauga, the 18th IN Battery was mustered out
on June 30th, 1865 after a 3 year term. 62
All six of these units made contributions to the great history that chronicles the exploits
of Wilder’s Lightning Brigade. While they are all a part of the story, the exploits of the Brigade
as a whole are the key questions to this story that need to be answered. Namely, they center on a
look at the battle record history of the brigade, to chronicle both their exploits and their actual
record, which despite the boasting remains one almost entirely of victory and successes.
The Lightning Brigade’s history spreads across several campaigns during the course of
the war: the Tullahoma Campaign, the Chattanooga Campaign, the Atlanta Campaign, and the
Wilson Raid through Alabama and Georgia. Each campaign contained at least one battle and one
large-scale raid that the Brigade participated in; smaller skirmishes containing less than a
regiment of the brigade, are ignored for the sake of brevity as the Brigade members often wrote
home, “I don’t know how soon we will go scouting again - We will go oftener than before no
doubt and that will make it nearly all the time”. 63 Basically, the brigade was out so often that
they skirmished with some group of Rebels on nearly a daily basis, accounting for probably
hundreds of encounters throughout the war, making it beyond the scope of this paper to try and
document them all. By discussing the major actions and encounters during the four campaigns,
the history of the Brigade should become clearer and the reason for their fame self-evident due to
their essentially unbeaten combat record. Their war record could also be broken up into before
and after the event that I have termed “The Split”, when in Nov of 1863 Col. Wilder went home
on sick leave and the various parts of the Brigade were assigned elsewhere for the winter
months, until April when Wilder returned and the Brigade was reunited (minus the 92nd IL and
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the 18th IN battery) just before the Atlanta Campaign began. 64 This will figure in more
importantly in analyzing their tactics later on as the average cavalry or infantry officer never
utilized the Brigade in the manner to which the men were accustomed, and certainly not to their
full potential. It also marks the only point since their inception where the unit’s combat
experience differs. The four campaigns encompass a number of battles/large skirmishes which I
would term key to the unit’s history: 10 battles/large-skirmishes, 9 raids, 2 counter-raids and one
capitulation. 65
The Tullahoma Campaign was short (June 23rd- July 7th, 1863), termed later as “One of
the war’s most notable military achievements” 66, and the first instance of the Lightning Brigade
(still almost derisively called the Hatchet Brigade 67 due to the issuing of two-foot long hatchets
for field fortification construction) was able to demonstrate their abilities with their newly
arrived Spencer repeating rifles and recently “acquired” mounts. 68 The major actions the Brigade
participated in during the campaign were termed the Liberty Raid (June 4th-13th, 1863) and the
Battle of Hoover’s Gap (June 24th, 1863). 69 While the Liberty Raid was considered outside the
Tullahoma Campaign, due to the brief period of the campaign and the Brigade’s limited
participation in it, it will be included for this paper. The so-called Liberty Raid occurred from
June 4th until June 13th, 1863 and included one major skirmish on the 4th. 70 Termed the first
major demonstration of the Spencers, the Brigade rode into Liberty, TN on the 4th about 6pm and
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drove out two regiments of rebel cavalry that were seated for supper. 71 They chased them from
town and captured 20 men of the 1st Kentucky Cavalry, a famous unit founded by President
Lincoln’s Brother-in-law General Ben Hardin Helm. 72 This would not be the last time they
encountered the 1st Kentucky. The next engagement was the unit’s most famous: the Battle of
Hoover’s Gap on June 24th. The opening act of the campaign to force General Bragg from
Tullahoma, Wilder’s Brigade was charged with opening the way to Tullahoma by taking one of
several mountain gaps between the command and Tullahoma which General Bragg had
fortified. 73 This first “sizable test” of the Spencer Rifle turned out to be a resounding victory; the
campaign was meant to contact the enemy around 10am with infantry support close behind
Wilder’s men to help consolidate any gains, but Wilder and his men quickly outpaced any speed
estimates with their mounts. 74 At 10 am the first of Wilder’s scouts make contact with pickets of
the 1st Kentucky Cavalry; they, along with supporting companies from the Brigade, rapidly
“sweep aside” the defending rebels and scattered them. 75 Surprise was total and an effort that
was expected to take days was over in hours. Wilder deployed his four regiments and Lilly’s
artillery battery, and efforts by the rebels to dislodge Wilder’s Brigade met with repeated failure
as rebel regiments encountered Spencer Repeating Rifles for the first time, leading one to ask
later, “what kind of Hell-fired guns have your men got?” 76 This proved the shock value the
weapons had against unprepared and unaccustomed troops. Despite being outnumbered and
being ordered out under threat of arrest, Wilder and the Brigade held the Gap until relief arrived,
first in the form of an additional artillery battery (the 21st IN Battery) and finally additional
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infantry divisions, who relieved the Brigade and held the gap for several days before the rebels
gave up and soon after were forced to withdraw from Tullahoma to Chattanooga. 77 The Wilder
Brigade, Lilly’s Battery and Col. Wilder himself were all heaped with praise for their actions.
General George Henry Thomas went so far as to say, “You have saved the lives of a thousand
men by your gallant conduct today. I didn’t expect to get to the Gap for three days”. 78 Gen.
Thomas also dubbed the men “Wilder’s Lightning Brigade” for the speed with which they
initially took the gap, a moniker that the men would proudly embrace and carry with them
through the rest of the war. 79 While this engagement would be the one the Brigade would be best
known for, the war was far from over and the Brigade still had much to contribute.
The second stage of the Lightning Brigade’s actions included the events of the
Chattanooga campaign (June 1863-September 1863). While the campaign itself ground to a halt
after the defeat of the Union army at Chickamauga, the Lightning Brigade participated in several
operations in the aftermath before they were separated into different commands following
Wilder’s health relapse in November of 1863. 80 Their first sizable action after Hoover’s Gap was
their raid on Chattanooga (August 21, 1863), once again part of General Rosecrans’s effort to
attack across a wide front to force General Bragg from his position. 81 Elements of the Brigade
approached Chattanooga so rapidly on the 21st that they not only captured the picket and 100
“dumbfounded teamsters”, but sunk their relief force on the river, sunk or damaged two steamers
and began shelling the city, all while the populace attended church service and initially refused to
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believe they were under attack, until a shell clipped the church steeple. 82 Following this
successful operation and crossing of the Tennessee River, the next significant action the brigade
found themselves in was the Battle of Rock Springs (September 12th, 1863). 83 Several actions
(including a pitched skirmish on Taylor Ridge by the 72nd IN) occurred in and around Ringgold,
GA, that resulted in a number of casualties on the 12th; Col. Wilder realized they were
surrounded by a superior force and effected a withdrawal after nightfall, building many false
fires, then probed for and located a weak point in the lines and punched through without alerting
the rebels, effecting their escape. 84 During the early morning hours of the 13th they had the
satisfaction of hearing gunfire as the rebels assaulted their false encampment. 85 Following what
would be the first of many narrow escapes by the Lightning Brigade, the next major action was
the Battle of Chickamauga (September 18th-20th). 86 One of the bloodiest battles of the war, the
action for the Brigade began the day prior to the official engagement’s start. Tasked with
guarding/picketing several crossings along Chickamauga Creek with one cavalry brigade in
support to the north, the Brigade found themselves engaged by over five brigades of rebel
infantry and an artillery battalion on their section of the line. 87 Still they managed to delay what
was supposed to be rapid crossing until the late afternoon, and then checked the advance several
miles back that evening as rebels streamed across the creek. 88 What followed was a massive
battle and one of the few instances where Union forces were outnumbered on the field by the
Rebels; Wilder’s men spent September 19th supporting many other brigades along their front by
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holding the line as other fell back, breaking every rebel unit that approached, then driving them
back to their original positions. 89 By the 20th, the Brigade had been moved to a position to the far
right and rear of the Federal Line, a position to keep them in a supporting role, but they ended up
being in the thick of the fighting as the right wing of the Army of the Cumberland broke and ran
back towards Chattanooga. Only Wilder’s aggressive tenacity kept the Rebel army occupied long
enough for General Thomas to mount his famous stand around Snodgrass Hill. 90 It is at this point
an encounter occurred that prevented the Wilder Brigade from making an assault on the enemy
rear that surely would have catapulted the Wilder Brigade into the forefront of history, for good
or ill, but the questionable orders that led to their withdrawal will be examined later. 91 Following
the disastrous battle where the Wilder Brigade remained one of the few intact units, they were
withdrawn back across the Tennessee River where they ended up in pursuit of Rebel cavalry in
what became known as the Wheeler Raid (October 1st-9th, 1863) which encompassed several
skirmishes, including one major action called the Battle of Farmington (October 7th, 1863), that
again demonstrated the Brigade’s combat prowess. 92 In addition to contributing significantly to
the pursuit of General Joseph Wheeler and limiting his damage to one wagon train, the Battle of
Farmington demonstrated the effectiveness of the Lightning Brigade in engaging cavalry in a
running battle that routed the opposing force and sent them fleeing through Farmington, tossing
their gear aside the whole way in an effort to expedite their escape from the Lightning Brigade,
who chased them for a mile out of town before darkness ended the pursuit. 93 Shortly after the
Wheeler Raid, the Wilder Brigade again participated in the pursuit of Rebel cavalry during the

Baumgartner, Blue Lightning, 217-244.
Baumgartner, Blue Lightning, 280-293, Bilby, A Revolution in Arms, 127-130, Rowell, Yankee Artillerymen, 119124, and Tucker, Chickamauga, 288-316.
91
Woodworth, Six Armies in Tennessee, 119.
92
Doyle, A History of the Seventeenth Indiana, 14-15.
93
Sunderland, Lightning at Hoover’s Gap, 105-110.
89
90

23

Roddey Raid (October 13th-22nd, 1863). Though their close pursuit could not bring General
Roddey to battle, they prevented him from effecting any noticeable damage to Union forces,
effectively ending the threat of Rebel raiders. 94 With this, the “Core” brigade completed their
final mission together before being split following Wilder’s next (but not final) departure for
health reasons.
During this period I have termed, “The Split” (November 1863-April 1864), the brigade
was broken up with the 18th IN battery being permanently assigned elsewhere and the 92nd IL’s
loose affiliation being ended for good; the 17th IN and 98th IL were sent to a separate command
and the 72nd and 123rd remained as a “Brigade” without a commander. 95 Both detachments from
the Brigade participated in actions in the theatre but both continued to run into a similar problem:
they ended up being the rearguard in a delaying action to prevent a rout following poor decisions
made by the operation commanders they were assigned to. 96 In both instances they blamed poor
generalship and bad decisions in the face of inferior forces. But this detachment would not last
more than several months, as they were reunited after Wilder returned during the spring of 1864
in the lead-up to Sherman’s Atlanta Campaign. The campaign, while not the resounding
vindication that the previous ones had been, still gave ample opportunity for Wilder and his men
to demonstrate their skills.
The Atlanta Campaign had a large number of notable engagements for the Lightning
Brigade: the Kingston/Rome Raid (May 18th-19th), the Dallas Raid (May 24th-28th), the Battle of
Big Shanty (June 9th), the Battle of Noonday Creek (June 20th), the Battle of Kennesaw
Mountain (June 27th), the Roswell Crossing (July 9th), the Covington Raid (July 21st-24th), the
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Stoneman Raid (July 27th-30th), the Battle of Rome (October 13th) and the Battle of Yellow
Creek (October 21st). 97 The Kingston/Rome Raid was an occasion for the Wilder Brigade (with
supporting cavalry) to demonstrate their effectiveness against wild rebel charges and still
accomplish their mission objectives. 98 Several days later, the Dallas Raid showcased the
Brigade’s ability to rapidly adjust to changing combat conditions, rapidly coming on line,
containing assaults then flanking around to gather Intel and dislodge the enemy. 99 Immediately
upon returning to the Union lines and trenches, they easily repelled an enemy assault while
inflicting grievous casualties. 100 Their first large-scale engagement, the Battle of Big Shanty, was
an assault on multiple enemy trenches at the urging of General William T. Sherman’s staff
officer who the General had instructed to bring back positive proof of enemy infantry holding the
position. 101 After assaulting three lines of trenches the officer was still not satisfied, so Colonel
Miller gave him a spyglass and asked him if he believed that men occupying the 4th line appeared
to be infantry? 102 He agreed they were and Col. Miller ordered the assault and took the works,
returning with prisoners to prove that the rebels facing them were infantry. 103 Colonel Miller
later quipped that, “It took Sherman five full days of fighting before he could get his infantry as
close to Kennesaw Mountain as the Lightning Brigade had been on June 9th”. 104 Despite several
skirmishes afterwards, their next action occurred on June 20th, 1864 at the Battle of Noonday
Creek as it would later be called. Their sister brigade of cavalry under Colonel Minty had
crossed the Noonday Creek and ran smack into two cavalry divisions, routing his forces and
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driving him into a box away from the ford. Colonel Miller spotted this as he was moving up to
support him, rapidly had three of four regiments charge across a rickety wooden bridge and met
the teeth of the assault head-on. 105 Nearly overrun, first by Minty’s retreating forces and then
eight brigades of enemy cavalry, the Lightning Brigade got on-line and engaged the enemy. They
held on despite close-in fighting and even netted several prisoners, Minty rallied behind them,
and during the later charges the Lightning Brigade’s remaining regiment moved in, with an
artillery battery also adding their weight, all during a torrential downpour. 106 They all managed
to pull back across the creek and withdraw, still having inflicted greater casualties on the
enemy. 107
The Brigade then participated in the ill-fated Battle of Kennesaw Mountain, where they
manned the trenches, covering the assault that was ill-fated for the army as a whole. 108 The next
encounter of note was their crossing at Roswell on July 9th. Moving to assault the enemy position
across the Chattahoochee River in Georgia, they crossed four companies as skirmishers across
the armpit deep ford following a cannon blast to kick-off the assault. 109 With the remainder of
the Brigade and an artillery battery covering them, they advanced under fire from the Rebel
sentries, though the fire inflicted no casualties due to the advance force ducking into the water
for cover, and the fact that the Rebels were stunned when the Hoosiers of the 17th and 72nd rose
out of the water and fired with no ill effect. 110 This unique incident of “bedazzling” their
opponents allowed the Brigade to rapidly cross and hold the ford as the disorganized Rebels fled
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in the face of what they thought was as superior force. 111 In addition, the Brigade suffered zero
casualties. 112 Soon after, the Brigade participated in the Covington Raid (July 21st-24th) that was
a great success in rapid movement and destruction of enemy property, but unfortunately was
overshadowed by the fact that the Battle of Atlanta occurred concurrently and led to a near defeat
for the Union Army. 113 Immediately after, the Brigade was attached to the ill-fated Stoneman
Raid (July 27th-30th). The mission was to destroy enemy material and communications, but was
sidetracked by the commanding General’s desire to liberate Andersonville Prison, so he left the
division containing the Brigade to, “do the fighting while Stoneman does the raiding”. 114 The
Brigade ultimately was the force selected to “cut the way out” for the division, due to their
reputation, and they successfully smashed through the enemy encirclement, fighting for 600
yards, then remounting and riding to safety with the remainder of their division’s cavalry; the
other divisions attached to the raid were all captured. 115 After yet another perilous escape by
Wilder’s Lightning Brigade, they continued to alternate between raids, scouts and trench duty
before their next notable encounter, the Battle of Rome (October 13th, 1864). 116 Following an
inconclusive and confused skirmish the day before, the Brigade, as part of General Kenner
Garrard’s cavalry division, pushed the enemy through several miles of brush and overgrowth
before assaulting an entrenched and fortified position of enemy cavalry and artillery. 117 They
charged across the field and drove the enemy from the position just in time for Col. Minty to
mount a “textbook” saber charge that utterly routed the enemy, all while the ‘doesn’t like
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cavalry’ General Sherman’s aide watched, earning them his praise in a rousing speech soon after
the action. 118 The final action the Brigade saw during the campaign was the Battle of Yellow
River (October 21st, 1864), where their division contacted with entrenched enemy forces. The
Brigade was brought up to assault the position, they took it and dug in, but upon seeing their
cavalry support on their flanks retreating were forced to withdraw, but in “good order”. 119 The
brigade continued skirmishing and foraging but turned in their mounts on the 1st of November to
General Kilpatrick as he had been chosen to accompany General Sherman’s army on his “March
to the Sea”. 120 After a short rest period in Louisville, they were remounted and sent on their final
campaign of the war: Wilson’s Raid through Alabama. 121
While a number of raids and skirmishes marked Wilson’s Raid, the Brigade participated
in three actions of note: the Battle of Ebenezer’s Church (April 1st 1865), the Battle of Selma
(April 2nd, 1865), and the Fall of Macon (April 20th, 1865). 122 The short list of engagements is
easy enough to explain, the war was on its final legs in the spring of 1865 and the enemy knew it.
The Battle of Ebenezer’s Church was fought outside of Selma against the famed southern cavalry
commander, General Forrest. Following contact with Rebel scouts, the Brigade pushed in Rebel
skirmishers before assaulting Forrest’s 2000 man force; the Wilder Brigade’s new (and very
green) sabre companies charged without orders, sowing confusion and nearly killing General
Forrest, severely wounding him before the rebels withdrew from their position with heavy losses
(mostly captured). 123 The following day they approached Selma as a single division as the
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remaining forces were pulled from the command to deal with cavalry forces active in the rear. 124
General Wilson ordered the Lightning Brigade to lead the assault, confident in their infantry
skills; in about 25 minutes the Brigade carried the works and drove the rebels into the city and
the secondary works, easily dislodging them from there with their support brigades as they
entered the city. 125 The Brigade suffered its highest casualties of war, especially their officer
cadre, but Col. Miller later remarked on the battle, “…the history of the war will not show
another instance where such formidable works, manned and defended with men and artillery,
have been stormed and captured by single line men without support,” referring to the lack of
reserve forces. 126 The gamble in the face of delay and risk of facing a more sizable defending
force led to a great victory and the destruction of the last great arsenal and industrial city of the
South. The Brigade’s final action was the Fall of Macon (April 20th, 1865). Following a number
of successful skirmishes in the days prior, the Lightning Brigade, with the 17th IN leading, drove
off a Rebel force of cavalry, saved a bridge from destruction and rode rapidly into Macon, only
to have large numbers of Rebels surrender to them without a shot fired. 127 Shocked at the ease of
the fall and uncertain of the rumors of the war’s end, they waited. That evening official channels
delivered to them the good news that the war had ended. 128
The Brigade fought through a number of intense engagements, not all of which are well
known in the annals of the Civil War, but often served to illustrate the great effect their unique
weapons and tactics had on the enemy, almost always leading to victory. With a history of the
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Brigade already discussed, the background needed most strongly to understand their tactics is of
the man who formed them in the first place, John T. Wilder.
V. John T. Wilder
The man who commanded the legendary Lightning Brigade, John Thomas Wilder, was
born in Hunter’s Village, Greene County, New York, up in the Catskill Mountains on January
31st, 1830. 129 Of English heritage, Wilder’s ancestors had fought in all major conflicts on the
continent since their arrival: his great-great-grandfather Edward Wilder fought in King Philip’s
War, his great-grand uncle Ephraim Wilder fought in the French and Indian War, his greatgrandfather and grandfather (both Seth Wilder) fought in the Revolutionary War, and his father
Reuben Wilder had served in the War of 1812. 130 In 1849, at the age of 19, he headed west to
Columbus, Ohio to make his fortune, learning the trades of draftsmen, patternmaker, and
millwright under Joseph Ridgeway while becoming skilled in mechanical and hydraulic
engineering. 131 Declining an offer to co-own the mill, Wilder continued west and set up shop in
Greenburg, IN, where his scale, foundry and mill-wright establishment brought him “pronounced
success”, leading him to build a number of mills in the Upper South and be recognized as an
authority on hydraulic engineering. 132 Married to Martha Stewart, a Greenburg founder’s
daughter, in 1858, the “handsome young man, of fine physique” held a number of patents and
had, “an estate of magnitude for the day”. 133 It was about this time the war broke out, and Wilder
was not one sit home and observe from afar.
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When describing Wilder, author Steven Woodworth stated, “Wilder seems to have
believed he could lick the world, and his men were inclined to agree”. 134 As in his civilian life,
this proved to be a very apt statement. Not waiting for permission or request, Wilder forged two
cannons and reported to Indianapolis with a company of men to form an artillery battery. 135 The
state declined to utilize them as such at that time, instead making them Company A of the 17th
IN, of which Wilder was elected Captain. 136 This company was later detached to form an
artillery battery dubbed “Wilder’s Battery”, but Wilder’s fortunes lay elsewhere. 137 Wilder was
quickly promoted to Lt Col. for his actions in West Virginia, entirely skipping the rank of Major,
making Colonel several months later after their Regiment commander, Milo S Hascall, was
moved up to Brigadier General. 138 During the early months of command, Wilder would end up
commanding a force equivalent to an under-strength brigade against the entire Army of
Tennessee and emerge not in victory but shrouded in honor. 139
Col. Wilder was on recruiting duty in August of 1862 and returning to the front via
Munfordsville, TN, when he was stopped there due to the movement of General Bragg’s
army. 140 Wilder, despite being outnumbered and barely half of the 3500 men present being
armed (one source claims only 1200), denied an offer to surrender and successfully repulsed an
assault by a far greater force under General James Chalmers on September 14th following a
second demand to surrender. 141 Two days later, after a large Rebel reinforcement and a small
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Union reinforcement that led to a temporary change of command (until that officer was ordered
arrested by army command), Wilder was asked to surrender for a third time on the 16th by
General Bragg himself, whose entire army surrounded the city. 142 Wilder, after consulting with
the officers present, took the “unusual” step to ask to meet with General Bragg to counsel with
him, admitting to him that he was not a military man by profession, he requested being advised
on his situation and ascertain his predicament. 143 Upon seeing the vast amount of men and
artillery arrayed against him, Wilder agreed to surrender his command and General Bragg was
impressed enough to let their colors march out, officers and men to keep personal property
(horses and arms), and paroled them back to Union lines. 144 It was noted by author Samuel
Williams that General Carlos Buell should have relieved the siege, reinforced Wilder or ordered
him out, but multiple authors note that Buell was relieved of command soon after, whether or not
is was at least a contributing factor is debatable but Wilder’s prestige was raised by his bold
defense and he soon acquired early exchange, and returned to the front. 145
It is at this moment in the fall of 1862 that Wilder was on the cusp of what would
arguably be his greatest accomplishment during the war: the idea to mount infantry forces and
equip them as well as he could. Author Glenn Sunderland describes Wilder stating, “His military
success stemmed from his burning desire to be a winner and from his successful background as
an engineer and businessman,” as the reason for his accomplishments in the war. 146 Author John
W. Rowell, in writing about the 18th Indiana Battery, claims, “Wilder’s intelligence, imagination,
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mechanical knowledge and topographical intuition were revealed in the activities of his brigade,”
something further discussion should prove unequivocally. 147 Historian and Author Richard
Baumgartner describes Wilder as “forward thinking and aggressive”, traits that, again, are
demonstrated in Wilder’s definitive attempts at problem solving. 148 Even with all these
wonderful descriptions of the man that would command the Lightning Brigade, the most telling
comes from author Samuel C. Williams in his article on Wilder: a “strong element of the unique”
was “imparted to the Brigade by its leader”. 149 “Unique” would be a great understatement for
what Wilder attempted in the midst of the Civil War, but his efforts would prove to be decisive.
But to have a solution, you must have a problem to be addressed, and that problem, from the
Union perspective, was perfectly embodied in the form of General Nathaniel Bedford Forrest and
his elite cavalry raiders.
VI. The Decision to Mount
In 1862, the Union had chronic shortages of cavalry in Tennessee. General Rosecrans
had, on paper, 6356 cavalry but effectives numbered closer to 5000 men; these men were
opposed by 6-8000 enemy cavalry. 150 While this even match-up to slightly outnumbered matchup could be considered a minor problem, in reality Union cavalry were widely considered to be
inferior to Rebel cavalry in all respects, with Generals like Forrest, Morgan, Roddy and Wheeler
striking fear in the hearts of many a union soldier. 151 But this was not a problem isolated to
Tennessee; in the armies, Confederate cavalry outnumbered Union totals 3-4 times and proved
themselves to be a great impediment. 152 These raiders often got into the Union rear areas,

Rowell, Yankee Artillerymen, 54.
Baumgartner, Blue Lightning, 11.
149
Williams, “General John T. Wilder”, 179.
150
Rowell, Yankee Artillerymen, 60.
151
Benefiel, Souvenir, Wilder’s Brigade Monument, Chickamauga section, 1-2.
152
Sunderland, Lightning at Hoover’s Gap, 14.
147
148

33

attacked supply trains, any Pro-Union forces they encountered, cut communication lines and
were able to do so by foraging off the land. 153 Back in Tennessee, Gen. Rosecrans was struggling
to find a solution to the enemy’s seemingly unstoppable cavalry. Desperate, he was approved by
the War Department to mount 5000 of his infantry, but received zero resources to do so, leaving
him stuck, until a young officer brazenly walked into his command post with a novel solution.
Col. Wilder, for several months prior to entering the General’s office, had been charged
with chasing down Gen. Forrest in the fall and then Gen. Morgan following his latest raid in
December of 1862. 154 The pursuit of Morgan’s cavalry was particularly grueling and futile from
the start; through cold, rain and snow, the Brigade under Wilder fruitlessly pursued Morgan
through Tennessee, unable to catch the bold cavalier even with his determined infantry. 155 The
only bright spot of the campaign was the locating of an “applejack still” that gave the men a
moments respite from the grueling march. 156 The rest of the campaign, in addition to the
absolutely miserable conditions and little food even to scrounge, saw at least one garrison fall
and Morgan’s raiders return to Rebel lines at their leisure. 157 The pursuit went through the New
Year’s and caused the Brigade to miss the Battle of Stone’s River, something that would be
particularly frustrating for a young colonel looking to prove himself with an equally young and
eager brigade. 158 It was during this unreasonable pursuit that Wilder, more out of frustration than
anything else, ordered his men to attempt to mount the mules of the wagon teams and catch
Morgan; this led to what was later described as a “comical scene” of men trying to get aboard
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angry mules. 159 One of the unit’s biographers, William Doyle, beautifully noted later that the
“Mules objected and thus prevented to the scout of Morgan”. 160 Sunderland describes the scene;
“The mules bucked, jumped on each other’s backs and tried to run under each other’s bellies in
order to dispose of their riders”. 161 While it is safe to describe this little experiment as a failure,
Wilder did not forget the lesson in futility of chasing a sharp cavalier like Morgan on foot, but he
was not dissuaded by the failure of the mules; rather, he was convinced that the solution lay in
mounting. 162 Upon returning to Murfreesboro, Col. Wilder went straight to Gen. Rosecrans for
an encounter that would lead to a historical decision. 163
Colonel Wilder could not have picked a better time to approach Gen. Rosecrans about
mounting his men. The Battle of Stone’s River had been a near catastrophe and cavalry had been
the chief impetus to the General’s plan. 164 Described by one author as a “logistical master”, Gen
Rosecrans had written General Halleck at the War Department on Jan 14th, 1863, stating, “I must
have cavalry or mounted infantry. I could mount infantry had I horses and saddles…with
mounted infantry I can drive the rebel cavalry to the wall and keep the roads open in my rear.
Not so now…Will you authorize the purchase of saddles and horses for mounting, when,
requisite, 5000 or more infantry?” 165 Still unable to get the support to mount the men available,
let alone the actual horses to do it, Wilder strode into the General’s Headquarters and in
passionate terms 166 stated, “If you will mount my men on horses and furnish them with the kind
of arms I want, we will chase John Morgan and Bragg’s cavalry to hell.” 167 Gen. Rosecrans,
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impressed by this display, first offered Wilder the horses rejected by the cavalry; knowing them
to be broken down and unsuitable for riding, he asked instead to “capture from the surrounding
country”. 168 While the different authors and sources all cite the conversation and decision
making thoughts similarly, they agree Wilder wanted to “fight like the devil” 169 and that
Rosecrans responded “enthusiastically”, with Special Field Order 44. 170 This Special Field Order
44, like many military communication documents from the period, is not exciting to read for lack
of any fluff or additional language, but this order had immense ramifications for both the brigade
Wilder commanded and future military tactics. The order, dated February 16th, 1863, simply
stated, “Brig Gen. J. J. Reynolds, commanding Fifth Division, Fourteenth Army Corps, is
authorized to mount the Second Brigade (Wilder’s) of his command” , signed by Gen.
Rosecrans’ adjutant. 171 This directive spawned a drive to mount his brigade, one that would be
accomplished efficiently and with great results down the line, but the order itself sheds no light
on just how exactly this was to be accomplished. The order very clearly commanded Brigadier
Gen. Reynolds to mount his second brigade, going so far as to indicate clearly that they referred
to Wilder’s brigade to avoid any confusion, dawdling or push back. 172 But the official order,
which was without a doubt clear on the point of mounting an infantry brigade, was silent on the
method. What is clear from other testimony was that this didn’t stop Wilder from accomplishing
the task.
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Now with orders in hand, Wilder set about mounting the brigade. His method, which he
had articulated to Gen. Rosecrans, was to “impress” horses from the surrounding counties from
“loyal rebel civilians”. 173 This effort to “forage” off of the “disloyal inhabitants” of the region
was a first in the Western theatre of war where the issue of property rights still weighed heavily
on the operations of the Army, but it was not without precedent, as in the East requisition had
already been going on for some time. 174 With this in mind, Wilder sent the first patrol to
“acquire” mounts for his Brigade; they returned with 43 prisoners, 300 horses and mules, and 50
beef cattle, at the cost of five men missing. 175 It took some time but after the first companies
received their mounts, capturing mounts for the rest of the Brigade became easy. On March 2nd,
1863, Private Horace Hobart of the 17th IN wrote that “Our regiment is now Mounted Infantry”,
noting that they took some horses refused by a cavalry unit. 176 Alva C. Griest of the 72nd IN
wrote that his company received theirs on March 22nd, 1863. 177 By mid-April, the entire brigade
had been mounted. 178 While “persuading” the locals to “give” their horses to his brigade had
been a relatively easy task for Wilder, he did have a real challenge convincing some of his men
that their efforts to mount were worthwhile.
The rumors about Wilder’s plans began to circulate in January, prior to the actual order to
mount, and the word was that the Brigade would be turned into cavalry. 179 They persisted
through March as Alva C. Griest of the 72nd wrote in his diary. “We are to fight as Infantry, but
are to do all our marching on horseback. On some accounts I like it, and on some others I dislike
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it.” 180 Wilder made very clear from the beginning that the brigade would be “mounted infantry”
and not cavalry, a distinction that was very important to the men in the unit due to infantry’s
prejudices against cavalry, and allowed all the regiments in the brigade (at this time the 17th IN,
72nd IN, 75th IN and 98th IL) to vote on the decision to mount. 181 The assurance that they would
be fighting as infantry and not become cavalry was enough for the men from the 17th IN, 72nd IN
and 98th IL, who voted to mount, but proved too much for the men of the 75th IN who opted to
not mount. They were soon replaced by the eager and willing, sometimes “substitute”, regiment
of the 123rd IL, who were enthused about the prospect of mounting. 182 Their first act on receiving
their new uniforms was to remove the yellow piping that would have marked them as cavalry. 183
Baumgartner cited the letter of one soldier who wrote that they removed the markings, “so that
we might not be taken for regular cavalry. We were a new branch of the service, simply mounted
infantry”. 184 The letters from the period often mentioned their excitement about their mounts and
the emphasis on the fact that they considered themselves mounted infantry, a distinction they
were apt to enforce. 185 Their distinction from cavalry did not however spare them the new
responsibilities that went along with being a mounted unit; in addition to the standard infantry
drill and responsibilities, they accepted the daily chores for horse care and all men learned to
ride, a difficult task as few had experience at it. 186 This grand design of Wilder’s, mounting
infantry on horse, mule or pony to ride into battle and then fight dismounted, was not always
credited to him. However, despite others fielding a similar strategy for engagements, Wilder’s
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method was unique in one very important manner: the idea that the mounts were simply for
conveyance.
The most difficult argument to counter with Wilder is whether or not his “mounted
infantry” concept was really his concept at all. Historian Jay Luvaas notes that, “Dismounted
tactics were not new, for dragoons had existed since the sixteenth century, but never before had
mounted infantry, as the Civil War cavalry was called, been employed on such a large scale---to
the incidental bewilderment of most foreign military observers”. 187 His work on the Civil War’s
legacy in Europe cited the famed Confederate General Forrest as a cavalry men who spent every
battle after Shiloh fighting dismounted, but he also brings up the point that cavalry during the
war learned the futility of fighting with swords when other advancements had been made,
changes that the Europeans paid little mind to. 188 So why then was Wilder’s Brigade different?
Samuel Reid published a propaganda peace shortly after the battle of Chickamauga in 1863 that
describes “squadron of cavalry” during a raid leading up to the battle. 189 Glenn Tucker’s
excellent piece on the battle of Chickamauga again described Wilder as one of the great cavalry
commanders of the war, while the official government work on the battlefield clearly
differentiated between “Minty’s Cavalry” and “Wilder’s Mounted Infantry”. 190 Benjamin Magee
is quoted in the Otto McManus biography and history as stating that, “They took their system of
drill from that devised by Confederate cavalryman John Hunt Morgan”. 191 While the
interchangeability of the terms to refer to Wilder can be confusing and the use of another’s
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method of drill does suggest he drew on others, interchanged terms only proved the difficulty in
classifying the Brigade and the use of Morgan’s drill system simply means Wilder used an
available solution to add to his method. The chief aspect of this drill that Wilder emulated was
the “number four man” designator; the men would be counted off and one man out of every four
was designated to hold the horses for the group. 192 Other sources confirmed that Wilder’s men
used this method, and weapons historian Joseph Bilby noted this by using this method: “A
dismounted cavalry regiment immediately lost one fourth of its potential combat strength when it
deployed to fight on foot”. 193 Though Forrest was still fond of this tactic, Major General J.E.B.
Stuart of the Confederacy had “little interest in his men as mounted infantry”. 194 Though
probably more for pride than anything else, it would be easy to cite this as a reason to keep men
mounted to maximize effectiveness. 195 A number of other sources name this method, as do most
accounts of the Brigade in action mention “the fourth man” remaining with their horses while
other went forward to fight. 196 And yet the claim of Wilder that, “He is credited with having
originated mounted infantry in the Civil War,” 197 should be accepted because his men started out
as infantry. While famous cavalrymen did utilize similar methods, they started out as
cavalrymen, their training and instinct would always spring from cavalry tactics, which would
make them more prone to galloping from danger 198, whereas Wilder’s men were infantrymen to
their core. This dictated their reactions and encompassed their entire mindset, meaning they were
more accustomed to standing under fire then cavalrymen were. But the problem of losing that
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fourth man is noted in Bilby’s book on Civil War weapons, since that fourth man represented a
quarter of a unit’s combat firepower. 199 Wilder could not have been unaware of this, as he was
fixated on making his brigade not only fully mounted, but arming them with the best weapons
possible. 200 Despite a furious letter exchange to Oliver Winchester to get Henry Repeating
Rifles, the waiting list was long and the numbers that would have been available per month were
too small. 201 Col. Wilder was fortunate that another source of repeating rifles happened to stroll
into camp in February of 1863, roughly the time he began mounting his Brigade. 202 This solution
came in the form of the Connecticut-Yankee Christopher Spencer peddling his Spencer
Repeating Rifle.
VII. Spencer and His Rifle Change the War
In Col. Wilder’s alleged statement to Gen. Rosecrans, Wilder had one other demand aside
from the mounting. His alleged words were, “If you will mount my men on horses and furnish
them with the kind of arms I want (emphasis mine), we will chase John Morgan and Bragg’s
cavalry to hell”. 203 The second part of Wilder’s plan was the more crucial of the two, as it wasn’t
enough to simply put everyone on horseback and call it a day. Wilder wanted to make his tactical
advantage overwhelming. Wilder is spoken of as wanting, “…to make themselves the most
effective command in the service…”, therefore he sought what he saw as the most effective rifle
at the time. 204 That rifle was, and nearly turned out to be, Winchester’s Henry Repeating Rifle. 205
This rifle could hold 16 cartridges, was breech loading and would end up being the forerunner to

Bilby, Civil War Firearms, 145.
Bilby, A Revolution in Arms, 89.
201
Ibid, 86.
202
Ibid, 89.
203
Benefiel, Souvenir, Wilder’s Brigade Monument, Chickamauga section, 2.
204
Rowell, Yankee Artillerymen, 65.
205
Baumgartner, Blue Lightning, 62.
199
200

41

the later historic Winchester Repeating Rifle. 206 While this rifle was widely considered to be the
best, and Wilder was in negotiations to acquire them directly from Oliver Winchester, it was not
to be as the contracts kept Winchester’s roughly 200 per month fabrication out of the hands of
private buyers. 207 Wilder’s need for 900 per month simply could not happen. 208 During the early
months of 1863, about the time Wilder was beginning his mounting of his brigade, Christopher
Miner Spencer entered the camp with his version of the repeating rifle. 209 His timing could not
have been better for a sales trip if he had tried. His demonstration to Gen. Rosecrans was seen by
many officers in the Army of the Cumberland, including Col. Wilder. 210 The “forward thinking
and aggressive” Wilder eagerly placed an order for what would become the, “…most advanced
breech-loading repeating rifle available in significant numbers…” 211 But what was it about
Spencer and his rifle that Wilder found so appealing and the perfect solution to his problem? To
best explain why Wilder ended up going through so much trouble to get it, we must first examine
the man behind the weapon, and what exactly this weapon meant for warfare.
Christopher Miner Spencer was born on June 20th, 1833 to Ogden and Asenath Spencer
in Manchester, CT. 212 Schooled there until 14, he entered manufacturing, working mainly in
textile mills, but also spending time working in machine shops at tool-building and locomotive
factories, with several fortuitous stints at the Colt Armory over his career that mainly centered
around the Cheney Silk Mills. 213 The time at Colt Armory should not have come as a surprise, as
his maternal grandfather had schooled him in woodworking and Spencer had possessed an
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interest in firearms from a young age, two things that would be important to a firearms
designer. 214 Spencer spent about five years (1854-1859) working on his design, perfecting a
“lever actuated rolling block action” with a buttstock tube magazine. 215 A short explanation of
how that worked is that you could load 7 waterproof cartridges (self-contained bullet and powder
in waterproof copper case) from a tube contained in the rear part of the rifle (the buttstock) by
working a lever to load a round and eject the spent casing of the previous one. 216 The weapon
could then be fired by cocking the hammer and then pulling the trigger. 217 His “boyhood
passion” led to the first prototype being patented on March 6th, 1860, patent no. 27,393. 218 This
rifle would prove radically advanced in a war where many were still using smoothbore muskets
identical to the ones used in the Revolutionary War, with only the minor change of a percussion
cap instead of a flintlock. 219 But despite his achievement and the perception by many that
Spencer was on to something, many in the War Department refused to accept the new
technology, forcing Spencer to work hard to lobby for his new product. 220
The road that ended up placing Spencer in Gen. Rosecran’s Headquarters had everything
to do with the pushback his new weapon was getting in Washington DC from the War
Department. Despite the war being on and weapons being difficult to find, Spencer struggled to
get government contracts. Granted, the War Department was besieged with people peddling new
inventions, but despite several positive tests, including one before President Lincoln himself,
Spencer was unable to secure more than a small contract with the Navy. 221 Not satisfied with the
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small contract, Spencer made a trip to Murfreesboro in Feb 1863. 222 The demonstration appealed
to Wilder, who was like-minded to Spencer in that they both worked in engineering fields and
were self-made men. 223 A vote by his men shortly thereafter went far smoother than the
mounting vote; while the men had been divided on mounting and votes had been somewhat
close, the vote on the Spencer rifle was unanimous to buy them. 224 It’s at this point Wilder began
his “unorthodox” attempt to secure the rifles for his Brigade. Unwilling to wait to for the hesitant
ordinance department and ordering directly from Spencer his repeating rifle, Wilder set up a
personal order for 2000. 225 Originally, he tried to secure a loan from his hometown Greensburg
Bank, mortgaging his factory and home along with co-signed promissory notes from each of his
men to pay the $35 226 for the purchase of the rifles. 227 It should also be noted that this inflow of
capital to the Spencer factory led historian James M. McPherson to credit Wilder with, “…the
introduction of Spencer Repeating Rifles by financing their manufacture”. 228 Wilder’s goal was
finally near fruition, and was finally realized on May 15th, 1863, a date specifically noted by the
17th IN’s biographer as the day the Spencers arrived to the Brigade. 229 The 72nd IN was armed
first, then the 17th IN on the 15th and 16th, next the 98th IL on the 31st. 230 The late arrivals to the
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Brigade, the 123rd IL, received theirs soon after mounting upon joining the Brigade on May
6th. 231 The Wilder Brigade now had the distinction of being the first mounted infantry unit in the
Army of the Cumberland. Several days later on June 4th they awarded the designation of being
the, “…first military unit in history of warfare to meet a force armed with repeating rifles,” to the
1st Kentucky Cavalry, but this would not be the last time the Kentuckians encountered the Wilder
Brigade. 232 The 1st Kentucky would again be driven from the field by the “heavy firepower”,
when at Hoover’s Gap the Brigade drove off the 1st Kentucky as they guarded the gap, then held
the field against overwhelming forces, earning the appellation “Wilder’s Lightning Brigade” for
their “rapid movements and efficient work”. 233
While the Spencer was considered about even in the contest of whether it or the Henry
Rifle was “the best”, the Spencer ended up becoming the most prolific due both to Christopher
Spencer’s ability to more rapidly turn out firearms, and also because of the ease to repair in the
event something did break down. 234 The men themselves even attested to the regard they held
their new weapon of choice, describing how they immediately took them to the woods to
“master” them, how the sound it would make in combat was “the sweetest music” during the
war, but firmly state that, “No rebel could stand the racket of those repeating rifles when once
brought to bear upon them”. 235 Historian Peter Cozzens cites one Civil War officer who deemed
the Spencer Repeating Rifle, “the most effective and complete weapon for actual service ever
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placed in the hands of soldiers”. 236 The testimonies from the soldiers themselves on the guns are
unique and colorful, but nearly unanimously positive, with the only detractor stating they were
too easy to fire. 237 W. H. H. Benefiel, soldier and 17th IN biographer, asserted that after acquiring
the rifle that, “…we were never defeated,” a mostly true statement as the engagement record for
the 17th IN and most of the rest of the Brigade never were driven from the field or defeated,
though they on several occasions covered withdrawals to prevent routs and retired in good
order. 238 Otto McManus, schoolteacher-turned-soldier of the 123rd IL, confidently wrote home to
his wife that, “I’ll bet all my land in Minnesota that forty of us can take iron Spencers (7
shooters) and whip 300 of them in open field or in woods,” referring to the “Butternuts” that
were troubling loyalists in the North. 239 An errant margin note by a forgotten ordinance officer of
the 92nd plainly stated, “Weapon: ‘Spencer I think it the best arm I have ever seen.” 240 But it
wasn’t just the men of the Brigade pouring praise on the Spencer. Colonel Smith D. Atkins,
commander of the 92nd Illinois who passed through service of the Brigade briefly, remarked after
the war on the Spencer: “the best arm for service in the field ever invented, better than any other
arm in the world then or now, so simple in its mechanism that it never got out of order, and was
always ready for instant service”. 241 But the most resounding endorsement of the Spencer
Repeating Rifle came from the Colonel himself. Wilder remarked,
“The Spencer magazine rifle…a most formidable weapon. I believe them to be the best
arm for army use that I have seen. No line of men, who come within fifty yards of
another force armed with Spencer Repeating Rifles, can either get away alive, or reach
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them with a charge, as in either case they are certain to be destroyed by the terrible fire
poured into their ranks by cool men thus armed. If the government would expend the
large sums now used to induce men to enlist, in arming the men now in the field with this
kind of weapon, the rebellion would be in my opinion, speedily crushed”. 242

Such resounding endorsements, particularly up and down the chain of command,
confirmed that the men of the Lighting Brigade believed in their decision to equip with the
Spencer Repeating Rifle and that it made an impact on their fortunes. While this would confirm
the belief the Brigade had in their mounts and their Spencers, what was the opinion of others,
friend and foe, of the effect they had on warfare?
VIII. Perspectives on the Brigade: The Union
While Wilder’s Lightning Brigade never rose to the post-war fame that units like the
Stonewall Brigade or the Iron Brigade enjoyed, during the war there were few in the Union’s
Western armies who hadn’t heard of Wilder’s boys. 243 But it’s the thoughts and opinions on the
unit itself that really tell of their impact on the war and the tactics it bred. From their inception
the Lightning Brigade had to prove its worth. The War Department had set up some hurdles with
their unofficial position that, “Mounted Infantry are neither good infantry nor good cavalry”. 244
Add this to a Department that feared using repeaters for the ammunition waste they assumed it
would cause (a belief they clung to even after the war’s end) and it is obvious the Brigade had a
large challenge to overcome. 245 This left the men of Wilder’s Brigade one option; prove them
wrong. Confident in their commander and their new weapons, the Lightning Brigade mounted
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and stepped off in June of 1863 for what would end up being the first of many resounding
demonstrations of their abilities.
The Battle of Hoover’s Gap would be not only a great Union victory, one described by
some after the war as, “One of the War’s most notable military achievements,” but the first time
that the Lightning Brigade demonstrated their new equipment and tactics. 246 Part of Gen.
Rosecrans larger plan to take Tullahoma, the Lightning Brigade was charged to be the leadbrigade of Gen. Thomas’ push through Hoover’s Gap, one of three above Tullahoma, TN. 247
Wilder had been “rankled” by Major-General David S. Stanley of the Union army several days
before the June 24th attack when he pushed to send a cavalry unit with the “tadpole” cavalry of
Wilder’s Brigade, to which Gen. Thomas assured Gen. Rosecrans that cavalry would not affect
the outcome one way or the other. 248 With this resounding endorsement of his new effort in
mind, Wilder and his Brigade smashed through the Gap and held it for several hours until relief
arrived in the form of an artillery battery and two infantry brigades. 249 This stunning victory led
the campaign to be completed in only 9 days, an amazing feat considering it was thought it
would require 3 days to take the one Gap! 250 General Thomas was quoted later as having told
Wilder, “You have saved the lives of a thousand men by your gallant conduct today”. 251 General
Rosecrans was alleged to have ridden up with Generals Reynolds and Thomas (essentially the
chain-of-command between Wilder and himself) and upon hearing Wilder’s explanation of his
conduct and observing the momentous results, turned to Gen. Reynolds and said, “Wilder has
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done right. Promote him, promote him”. 252 This engagement was also where the Brigade
officially picked up the name “Lightning Brigade” (much to the pleasure of the men) per an
official commendation from General Thomas to the Army, one that also directed other units to
“emulate” them. 253 Their first, but certainly not last, appearance in print was carried in the
Cincinnati Gazette at the time, stating, “Thus the first and most critical step of the campaign was
won by Wilder’s soldiership,” a rather boisterous but not inaccurate account of the Brigade’s
efforts. 254 The next major demonstration of their abilities would be at the Battle of Chickamauga,
but that would be almost three months later, and there was plenty to do meanwhile.
Prior to the movement on Chattanooga, Wilder’s Brigade came under scrutiny for their
foraging habits, not long after Wilder went home on one of his frequent sick leaves. Following
“reports” made of “depredations” and “outrages” committed by the Brigade on their forage
expeditions, Gen. Reynolds launched investigations, court-martials and general orders to the
command to stop the supposed offenses, with Generals Thomas and Rosecrans weighing in. 255
While every unit will have individuals involved in less than acceptable behavior, Lt Col. Henry
Jordan noted in his letter to Wilder warning him of the allegations that Gen. Reynolds has made
no secret that he was upset that he was often skipped in the chain of communications that Wilder
made to command, which he and the author Baumgartner noted was probably the reason for the
witch hunt. 256 This was simply officer politics at its worst, since only one officer was ever
charged and those charges were later dismissed. 257
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In the meantime, Gen. Rosecrans had an encounter with several of Wilder’s men
following the Chattanooga crossing, but before the Battle of Chickamauga. The men were
brought in as stragglers but they claimed to be from Wilder’s Brigade and out foraging. 258 They
were disbelieved as it was thought that the Wilder’s Brigade had been cut-off and captured. 259
Eventually convinced by their adamant insistence they were from Wilder’s Brigade, Gen.
Rosecrans told the detail, “Wilder’s men beat the devil, anyhow; take them to Wilder---he’s the
only man that can manage them”. 260 Several days later on the 18th of September, the Battle of
Chickamauga began for the Lightning Brigade when they contested several bridges over the
creek and delayed the rebel army for several hours before being forced to withdraw back several
miles. Wilder sent word to General Crittenden that they were attacked by a large rebel force who
was now crossing the creek in great numbers, but this was disbelieved by the General, who went
so far as to deny that the enemy was in any noticeable number anywhere in the vicinity and
disbelieved a second report from a different unit that the rebels were attacking across the
creek. 261 Gen. Crittenden then learned the hard way that the Lightning Brigade did not
exaggerate: Crittenden ordered forward a Brigade under Gen. Wood, even going so far as to tell
Col. Wilder, “Colonel, we expect to hear a good report from you,” still chastising Wilder only
this time in front of his men, who were now dug in across Vinard Field. 262 Well, the General
soon got his report from several thousand rifles and muskets on Gen. Wood’s Brigade’s front and
flanks, breaking it, scattering them and driving them from the field. 263 A shocked Gen.
Crittenden rode for his life in utter disbelief, while the Lightning Brigade jeered him for his lack
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of faith in their reports. 264 The Lightning Brigade’s word vindicated, they dug in and continued
to fight as the combat worsened.
Despite the negative outcome for the army as a whole, Wilder’s Lightning Brigade was
one of the few bright points of the engagement, holding their own far longer than any other
command under difficult conditions. Gen Rosecrans described Wilder’s efforts after the battle:
“His command merits the thanks of the country for his noble stand at the crossing at
Chickamauga,” as the delay had allowed the Union army to reposition and avoid being totally
routed and destroyed piecemeal. 265 General Thomas went so far as to write a recommendation
(sent Nov 27th, 1863) for Wilder’s promotion due to the Brigade’s actions. 266 On Sept. 30th,
1863, Gen. Thomas sent a direct cable to Washington informing them of Wilder’s action in
driving Gen. Wheeler’s Confederate cavalry from Tennessee, “…without his having materially
interfered with Gen. Rosecrans communication”. 267 Despite a hard fight less than a week prior
and a nearly shattered Union Army in Chattanooga, the Wilder Brigade continued to be a force
on the field. Gen. Thomas continued to make use of and praise the results of the Lightning
Brigade, acknowledging a dauntingly long front he had assigned to them for defense and noting
their fatigue and lack of rest, but also that, “...all of which I take into notice. Knowing your
former zeal and integrity…” signed by Gen. Thomas. 268 Despite the hardships and continued
demand on the Lightning Brigade, their General held them in high esteem and didn’t just expect
that the task will be completed, but knew so. But even after the great efforts around Chattanooga,
there was still another year-and-a-half of fighting to go.
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Though Wilder would often be down with illness for the remainder of his career, before
he was sent home in 1864 his brigade continued to earn Union praise wherever they went.
During the Battle of Big Shanty during the Atlanta Campaign, the cavalry-hating General
William T. Sherman sent one of his staff officers to observe their new division commander Gen.
Kenner Garrard during the operation. The ludicrous scene unfolded where the Lightning Brigade
was forced to assault four lines of enemy entrenchments due to the staff officer not being
convinced each time that they had really attacked entrenched infantry. 269 Perturbed, Gen. Garrard
handed his spyglass to the officer and asked if he believed the men in the next line were infantry.
Upon replying in the affirmative, Gen. Garrard ordered Col. Abram Miller (acting Brigade
commander) to take the position and bring back prisoners, which he did and returned to General
Garrard with a company of men as prisoners, to which the staff officer replied, “Well, if that
does not convince Sherman where Johnston’s army is, he will find out when he occupies the
ground we are now on with his infantry”. 270 While a demonstration of the callousness that could
develop when commanders wanted intelligence very badly, the staff officer’s terse reply
demonstrates that the Brigade had earned his respect, but such respect would be even harder won
from Sherman. On October 13th, 1864, during the Atlanta Campaign around Rome, GA,
Sherman’s General Cox arrived on scene with two infantry divisions thinking he would need to
assist Garrard’s cavalry, only to find the Lightning Brigade taking a fortified position with great
speed and the oft-sister command of Minty’s Cavalry executing a “picture book” sabre charge
that utterly routed the rebels and “…so widely scattered them…” that Minty’s men were forced
to return to the command for lack of any sizable force to pursue. 271 General Cox, extremely
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impressed by the “aggressiveness and effectiveness” of the action, gave a well-received speech
to the Brigade and the rest of Garrard’s command. 272 While Sherman was not present for any of
these actions, continued glowing reports about “mounted units” should surely have softened his
position, even if there was no evidence that they’d changed it. Even though Sherman never
acknowledged the Lightning Brigade specifically, the men who encountered them personally
were almost always won over by their efforts.
With the war drawing to a close, Wilder’s Lightning Brigade had earned wide acclaim
across many different battlefields, but the most telling of their effectiveness comes not from
leading generals, but from their final on-scene commander, General James H. Wilson, and the
other men-in-ranks. General Wilson was a famous, albeit young, cavalry general from Illinois
who was assigned to lead an attack on Selma, Alabama to knock out the South’s ordinance
production and arsenals located there. 273 Prior to the attack, Col. Miller, the new Commander of
the Lightning Brigade, was ordered by General Wilson to lead the attack on the city: Col. Miller
was extremely honored and delighted in the “confidence” the General held in him. 274 In reality,
Wilson had chosen the Lightning Brigade as they were, “most accustomed to fighting on
foot”. 275 The General’s faith in their abilities as infantryman was a long advancement from the
War Department’s belief that, “Mounted Infantry were neither good infantry nor good cavalry,”
a belief that was quickly dispelled by any officer who encountered the men of Wilder’s
Lightning Brigade. 276 It was not just the officers who had come to know the reputation of
Wilder’s Lightning Brigade, but most men in the ranks of the Union Army. An incident
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recounted in Benjamin McGee’s Regimental History of the 72nd best illustrates the reputation the
Brigade carried with them wherever they went. During the Atlanta Campaign near Resaca,
Georgia about the 16th of May 1864, the Brigade was passing by a number of infantry units on
the road. 277 As infantry had right of way on the road, Wilder’s men attempted to pick their way
through the brush, crowding the roadside; as infantry don’t have any love of cavalry, they began
jeering the mounted men in the dark, and the mounted men began to give it right back, until the
2nd Minnesota Battery (who had been rescued from capture by the Wilder Brigade at
Chickamauga 278) told their comrades to hush up as that was Wilder’s Lightning Brigade of
Mounted Infantry. 279 Holding great respect for a mounted unit that had fought dismounted with
infantry at Chickamauga, the division quieted down and the Wilder Brigade passed peaceably to
their destination. 280 This story splendidly illustrates the reputation and respect that Wilder’s
Brigade had acquired with their actions, a good indicator of the effect and value they had to the
Union Army. But there is a better indicator of the skill and prestige of a unit, and that comes
from how one’s enemy views you.
IX. Perspectives on the Brigade: The Enemy
The esteem which an enemy holds their adversary can often be a good measure of the
quality of the men they face. The first major interaction between members of Wilder’s 17th
Volunteer Infantry Regiment came several months before the Battle of Cheat Mountain. In
August of 1861, Company E of the regiment was acting in support of Federal Outposts in West
Virginia, and sent 10 men on a patrol. 281 While on that patrol they spotted an enemy officer and
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Sgt. Weiler of the Company E fired on and felled him. 282 Upon examining the body they
discovered General Robert E. Lee’s battle plans on him, and quickly determined that the officer
was Colonel John A. Washington, Lee’s adjutant and nephew. 283 Knowing the identity of the
man they had felled was not only a relation of General Lee, but a descendant of George
Washington himself, Col. Wilder sent word through the lines to return the body to General Lee
and rode in the ambulance with Sgt. Weiler to Lee’s Headquarters to return the heir of
Washington’s house to his uncle. 284 Gen. Lee was extremely touched and sent word back to
Wilder thanking him for the courtesy. 285 Such acts of honor would fade towards the end of the
conflict but Col. Wilder encountered one of the war’s top commanders very early in the conflict,
and earned his gratitude for his actions. Whether or not Lee would recall this incident in later
years is unknown, but that Wilder would win praise and gratitude from the enemy’s top General
speaks much of the man’s quality, as well of the men of the 17th who rode with the Col. to return
the body of the man they had felled. While such encounters speak well of the men’s character,
later encounters speak far greater volumes about their combat skills.
The first account by the rebels of Wilder’s Brigade came around June 13th, 1863, when
the brigade, recently having acquired their Spencers, attacked and captured 20 men of the First
Kentucky Cavalry, a unit that until that point was renowned for skill and known for its founding
by President Lincoln’s Brother-In-Law, Benjamin Hardin Helm. 286 The next day they skirmished
with a greater force of the First Kentucky as well as the 8th and 11th Texas and 2nd Regular
Confederate Cavalry and drove them from the field, with only the addition of a regular Federal
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Cavalry unit. 287 After the second engagement, a captured Rebel Lieutenant offered the first
historical analysis of the Wilder Brigade: “what kind of hell-fired guns have your men got?” 288 It
would appear that the most readily apparent advancement of Wilder’s Lightning Brigade was
their use of the Spencer Repeating Rifle, whose early usage would seem to have the advantage of
shock-value as few men had encountered such weapons, an effect they would enjoy through
much of the war. While a good first outing for the Lightning Brigade, the first major engagement
would come at the Battle of Hoover’s Gap, where Wilder’s Brigade would earn their official
title, and many Confederate messages, official and personal, would be devoted to those ‘hellfired’ rifles.
The 1st Kentucky Cavalry’s second encounter with Wilder’s Brigade on June 24th, 1863,
went even more poorly than the first, and as author Steven E. Woodworth describes they were,
“wondering what the war was coming to, with powerful infantry formations suddenly
transforming themselves into powerful cavalry formations”. 289 This second poor encounter with
the Wilder Brigade for the 1st Kentucky started what would be Wilder’s finest hour, a rapid
advance followed by holding a position against a numerically superior force for several hours.
One of the rebel horseman during the engagement was quoted saying to his fellows, “Those
Yankees have got rifles that won’t quit shootin’ and we can’t load fast enough to keep up.” 290
The Rebel General William B. Bates, who faced off with the Wilder Brigade that day, later
described the encounter: “a bloody engagement here ensued with great odds against us, and after
futile but persistent and gallant effort to dislodge him, Colonel Rudler properly withdrew his
command under cover of the bank…the enemy turned our already extended left flank giving and
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enfilading fire to the Twentieth Tennessee.” 291 General Bates was also quoted later that he had
believed the opposing force of “Yankees” (as rebels continued to mistakenly call Hoosiers
throughout the war) outnumbered him 5-to-1. 292 This engagement was also allegedly the source
of the quote attributed to a Rebel officer: “Yankees could load on Sunday and shoot all the rest
of the week,” one that had been previous listed as, “load on Sunday and fired all week”, in
another source and adorns an exhibit at the Civil War Museum underneath the War Memorial in
downtown Indianapolis today. 293 While rebel forces repeatedly mentioned the previously unencountered and powerful Spencer’s firepower in most engagements, it should be noted that it
was always attributed after an engagement and that Gen. Bates still continued to attack Wilder’s
Brigade despite earlier failings against the new weapon.
The most interesting mention of Wilder’s Lightning Brigade came in, of all places, a
Confederate publication about the Battle of Chickamauga (spelled Chicamauga in this source).
The author describes Gen. Wilder, an unsurprising mistake as the Rebels always had an excess of
Generals and sometimes assumed they encountered higher ranking officers because of it, as
having driven off General John Pegram’s cavalry. 294 General Pegram’s own recollection of the
engagement was of an “unequal contest” mostly stemming from the firepower the Lightning
Brigade could bring to bear, despite forcing the Brigade to withdraw, as the casualties were
lopsided against the Rebels as Gen. Pegram described later he, “maintained for several hours
with notable obstinacy and gallantry”. 295 And also, “For a time the fight was almost hand to
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hand. My loss was about fifty killed and wounded, their’s thirty killed or wounded. We fought
for two hours Wilder’s Lightning Brigade---the picked brigade of the corps”. 296 General
Pegram’s account is very closely aligned with other accounts of the battle from the federal
perspective and gives an unveiled compliment and opinion of the Brigade: ‘the picked brigade of
the corps’. Such a view shows that Pegram believed Wilder and his Lightning Brigade to be one
of the best in the enemy’s service, no higher description could have been given. The next day
that Confederate publication claims that, “At mid-day a squadron of our cavalry came dashing
through our lines of skirmishers followed by the “Lightning Brigade” of Wilder. Our infantry
and artillery immediately opened up with buck, ball, and canister and sent them to the right with
many an empty saddle”. 297 While the dates and location are accurate when compared with other
sources, the claim of, “many an empty saddle” strikes me as a propagandist untruth, as records
bear out that casualties were low for the brigade in this time period leading up to the Battle of
Chickamauga. 298 It is during this major engagement that Wilder’s Lightning Brigade had some
of their most famous interactions with the Confederates of the war.
The Battle of Chickamauga is described has having begun September 19th and ended the
evening of September 20th, but Wilder’s Brigade was in contact with the enemy starting the
morning of the 18th. The gallant defense by Wilder’s Lightning Brigade and Minty’s Cavalry of
the Chickamauga creek crossings was described in a Rebel report after the battle: “The force in
our front consisted of Wilder’s Brigade, from whom we captured half a dozen or more breechloading rifles. Our loss was 105 killed and wounded, and I can only account for this
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disproportion from the efficiency of this new weapon”. 299 Once again, the unique equipment of
the Lightning Brigade was credited for great effect on the Rebel forces, whose tenacity delayed
the enemy for some time. Gen. Bragg himself later said the “cavalry” slowed the attack and that,
“Alexander’s Bridge was hotly contested”. 300 If the commanding General feels compelled to
comment on your actions during a battle, you have obviously had some effect on its outcome.
During the battle’s first day (Sept.19th) a shocked rebel officer demanded to know on his capture,
“What kind of guns have you got over here? We thought you’d have to reload, but you jus’ kept
shootin’ and shootin’”, further testament to the value of the Spencer against those unaccustomed
to it. 301 During the final day of fighting, Gen. Arthur Manigault recorded later the fierceness of
the battle against Wilder: “My three right regiments being thrown in much confusion, a large
force of the enemy advancing through the field on my center…I ordered the Brigade to fall back
about three hundred yards across the Chattanooga and LaFayette Road”. 302 From another
General’s perspective, “Wilder’s Brigade in furious charge swept down on Manigault’s flank and
rear and drove them in wild confusion, etc.”. 303 In a separate incident earlier in the day’s
engagement, John Rippetoe (a member of Eli Lilly’s Battery) wrote, “…it is reported that a rebel
general when he found out that it was our brigade that he was facing ordered his men to retreat at
the double-quick”. 304 While not connected to the same units, together these two incidents
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illustrate the reputation and, more importantly, the effect Wilder’s men had on the field of battle:
routing enemy Brigades and compelling others to withdraw to find more reinforcements to tangle
with Wilder’s men. In addition to this local disruption, General Longstreet himself later stated
“the steady and continued racket of these gun led him to think an army corps had attacked his left
flank,” and the delay is alleged to have given Gen. Thomas, USA, time to make his stand and
prevent a total rout. 305 General Longstreet also stated later that, “It is my opinion that Bragg
thought at 3pm that the battle was lost,” referring to the delay caused by Wilder, giving weight to
the argument not only that Wilder and his Brigade had an effect on the battle’s outcome, but that
they are the reason Gen. Thomas was able to make his stand and become known as the “Rock of
Chickamauga”. 306 While the day had ended in a defeat for the Union Army, Col. Wilder and his
Lightning Brigade, from the perspective of the Confederates anyway, appear to have prevented
the defeat from turning into a rout. While the Lightning Brigade would continue to fight for the
remainder of the war, this battle would certainly mark the peak of their fame and arguably be the
point where they had the greatest effect on a battle’s, and possibly even the war’s, outcome. But
that said, there were still nearly two years of conflict remaining during which the Brigade was
not idle.
While they fought in a number of engagements and raids during the remainder of the war,
three encounters in particular seemed to garner the notice of the Rebels they encountered: the
Wheeler Raid (Sept. 30th-Oct. 8th, 1863), the Roswell Crossing (June 17th, 1864) and the Wilson
Raid (Spring 1865). The Wheeler Raid occurred shortly after the Battle of Chickamauga and the
withdrawal of the army to Chattanooga. The Lightning Brigade was sent as part of a Federal
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force after General Wheeler and his cavalry who were attempting to raid the Federal rear after
crossing the Tennessee River in order to disrupt supply and communications to force a further
withdrawal of Union force from Chattanooga. 307 Wilder and the Union Cavalry units assigned
pursued and met them in battle on several occasions, ultimately driving them back across the
river with losses and not having accomplished any objectives. 308 Colonel George Hodge, CSA,
accounts one of the engagements later as an attempt to halt the Lightning Brigade’s rapid
advance on the main force, “but the impetus of the Lightning Brigade’s attack carried the entire
division back in continued retreat…For five and one half hours over seven miles of country the
unequal contest continued; my gallant brigade was cut to pieces and slaughtered”. 309 The next
day the Rebel forces were routed in a pitched battle at Farmington and half of Wheeler’s
command failed to escape across the river, either killed or captured. This account was in line
with many of the descriptions of engagements with the Lightning Brigade, who were known for
rapid advance and heavy casualties inflicted upon the enemy. Without a doubt, the methods
employed by the Lighting Brigade were effective and utterly devastating in some instances.
These methods on occasion though even led to the Rebel forces being ‘mesmerized’ by what
they saw. At Roswell, Ga on June 17th, 1864, the Brigade was ordered to effect a crossing of the
Chattahoochee River to establish a bridgehead for a larger crossing. 310 While advancing under
fire, the Brigade members would duck down into the armpit deep water to lever the next round
before rising to fire again. 311 The rebels defended the crossing were alleged to have said, “Look
at them Yankee son of bitches, loading guns under water! What sort of critters be they, any how?
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It’s no use trying to fight agin’ fellas that’ll dive down to the bottom of the rivah and get that
powder and ball!” 312 The troops were so “bedazzled”, too shocked to even fire back that the
advance guard quickly crossed, sending the guards fleeing and allowing the remainder of the
Brigade to wade across unopposed. 313 The final observations on the Brigade came in April of
1865, the final days of the Confederacy, as the Lightning Brigade fought under General Wilson
in the famed Wilson Raid to Selma. The Battle of Ebenezer’s Church, April 1st, 1865, saw
members of the Lightning Brigade, namely the 17th Indiana, nearly alter the course of history.
Charging without orders a line of General Nathaniel Bedford Forrest’s cavalry, Lt. Col. White
realizes his error nearly too late and ordered a turn that saved the four companies from
annihilation. 314 This included all except 16 men under Captain James D. Taylor who continued
forward and attacked the General himself! 315 Despite wounding him severely, Gen. Forrest broke
away and shot dead the Captain after a pitched skirmish that resulted in all 16 being killed,
wounded or captured. 316 Days later, the still visibly wounded Gen. Forrest told a Union officer
during a parlay, “If that boy had known enough to give me the point of his saber instead of its
edge, I should not have been here to tell you about it”. 317 Thus, Gen. Forrest narrowly avoided
being added to this list of Generals killed towards the end of the war. While much was said of the
Lightning Brigade by the enemy during the war, most of it stands as testament to their abilities
and the effectiveness of the new Spencer Repeating Rifles. However, there was one group of
people in a position to better observe the actions and effectiveness of the Lightning Brigade, and
that’s the men themselves. The members of the various regiments and batteries attached to the
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brigade were prolific writers before, during and after the war, leading to several published diaries
and unit histories. These accounts lead to many more interesting observations about the
Lightning Brigade.
X. Perspectives on the Brigade: The Men Themselves
“We are to fight as Infantry, but are to do all our marching on horseback. On some
accounts I like it, and on some others I dislike it,” and so began the Wilder’s Brigades
experiments with mounting and repeating rifles, experiments that would prove effective. 318 The
men’s own observations on these actions are often more telling about the perceived effect the
men were having. The first action that garnered note in a number of letters and diaries was the
decision to mount the men, a decision that one recollection attempts to describe: “attempt to form
a mule brigade to chase Morgan was the conception of the idea which resulted in Col. Wilder
having the Brigade mounted some months afterward”. 319 Letters and diaries from this period all
show how the men were pleased they are not to be marching everywhere on foot and approved of
their new mounts, showing their support of the mounted concept. 320 The final equipping act for
the Lighting Brigade was a better rifle: “The 17th Ind. our most enterprising Regt. had intended
buying themselves the Henry 16 shot rifle and paying for them out of our wages…Gen.
[Colonel] Wilder admiring the Zeal manifested by the Regiment, to make themselves the most
effective command in the service has Just Closed a contract with Mr. Spencer the inventor of the
celebrated ‘Spencer 7 shooting rifle’ to furnish our entire Brigade with them at the expense of
each man”. 321 Otho McManus describes this rifle in May of 1863: “every man has a fine Spencer
Rifle which can be loaded with eight balls at once and all fired in less time than required to load
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a common squirrel gun”. 322 McManus goes so far in his description of the Spencer to his wife,
heavily confident in its abilities, to claim that, “I’ll bet all my land in Minnesota that forty of us
can take iron Spencers (seven shooters) and whip 300 of them in open field or in woods,” while
discussing Butternuts back home in Illinois. 323 While McManus slips between saying it’s a seven
shooter and that they can fire eight shots, it might have to do with the fact that they had
discovered you could have seven rounds in the tube, but one more in the chamber, a designator
that they would refer to in modern rifles (or shotguns) as “7+1”. In either case, many of the
letters and diaries during the buildup describe a desire to, “try the Spencer’s on the rebs”. 324
Major James A. Connelly, of the 123rd IL, described his regiment and his commander, Col.
James Monroe,
“Now the regiment has become a machine, and now comes the hour of trial for its
commander---he must ascertain where the enemy is the best way he can---he must see
and think for the whole regiment. Must direct every movement, and watch every
movement of the enemy---he is responsible for the safety and honor of the regiment, and
if it makes a mistake disgrace stares him in the face. He must be cool when all others are
excited. Must stand when all others are disposed to run”. 325

It would seem that at this point the more junior officers recognized that all actions for
good or for ill rested on their commanders, as they seemed already to believe that the methods of
mounting and the new Spencer were more than adequate. Despite successful raiding and a small
skirmish, the Brigade’s first real test came at Hoover’s Gap, an engagement that nearly all men
of the Brigade mentioned in their writings.
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In the summer of 1863, John M. King wrote of the now-famous Lightning Brigade:
“…winning laurels wherever they went…”, “could not be driven from a front charge”, and “No
rebel could stand the racket of those repeating rifles when once brought upon them”. 326 We
might be able to discount this boasting from a Brigade member, but at this point the 92nd Illinois,
of which King was a part, was not yet a member of the Brigade. Efforts were being made to have
them join in but, as King puts it, “No one hardly dare hope for success, but were willing to await
the results of the effort”. 327 This high opinion of Wilder’s Brigade and their desire to join
stemmed from the first major action by Wilder’s boys: the Battle of Hoover’s Gap. The
regimental history of the 123rd Illinois describes the battle’s opening: “The farther they went the
larger the rebel force of cavalry kept growing before them, but the rapid pace gave the enemy no
time to form, until about 9 o’clock in the morning, by which time these two regiments had
advanced to and seized Hoover’s Gap, a place of great natural strength…”. 328 The rapid advance
came as a result of the units’ mounting and allowed them to deploy to face the inevitable
counter-attack. An account by Captain John S. Wilson describes a scene from the battle:
“‘Steady.’ The word came from lip to lip along the line, while the yell of the enemy grew
nearer and nearer, and the men awaited breathlessly the quickly following order, ‘Fire!’
A sheet of flame shot from the kneeling line. The assaulting column hardly wavered.
Wilder’s men threw forward the butts of their breech-loaders in the peculiar position for
charging that weapon. The enemy, now rapidly advancing, within a short distance, saw
the movement, and, ignorant of the purpose, mistook it for a sign of surrender, and
shouted in triumph. Back to the shoulder came the many-charged rifles, and a second
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volley flashed in faces if the astounded enemy. Again! Again! The column wavered, but
still passed on”. 329

This account best describes the shock value the new technology had against an enemy
that was not used to it, and predisposed to headlong charges at enemy lines. Alva C. Griest also
describes a scene from the battle, highlighting the Rebels’ futile tenacity:
“They seemed determined to capture this battery and in spite of shot, grape and shell kept
on advancing with their demonic yells, until within 200 yards, when we opened a
murderous fire upon them with our 7 shooters, which effectually checked them and they
fell back in the woods and their batteries began throwing shell at us and many a poor
fellow was sent to his long account”. 330

The great effect they had on the enemy was lost on few. Col. Wilder himself said of the
battle:
“The effect of our terrible fire was overwhelming to our opponents, who bravely tried to
withstand its effects. No human being could successfully face such an avalanche of
destruction as our continuous fire swept through their lines. This was the first battle
where the Spencer repeating rifles have ever been used, and in my estimation they
were…strong and not easily injured by the rough usage of army movements”. 331

Capt. Eli Lilly of the 18th Indiana Battery did not dispute this account, describing how the
enemy, “fell to the ground to escape the tornado of death,” and that, “Their loss must have been
considerable at this point from the number they were seen to drag off by the arms”. 332 It was
readily apparent to all men present that not only had the Spencer been effective, but that it had
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been key to their victory. But this was but the first of many examples of the wonderful
advancements that the Brigade was a part of.
Though the next major battle that the Brigade was a part of was the Battle of
Chickamauga, the period between Hoover’s Gap and that was not idle time for the Brigade. In
addition to several raids and skirmishes, the Brigade found themselves engaged on Sept. 12th in
what became known as the Battle of Rock Springs, between Chattanooga and the Chickamauga
Creek. The Brigade, engaged piecemeal in several locations was nearly cut off before effecting
their escape; a Corporal Records stated later that, “Had it not been for our men being armed with
the Spencer Rifle, there is no doubt but that the entire battalion would have been gobbled up”. 333
This account is actually in line with the men’s descriptions that Wilder had a knack for getting
them out of tough spots, as John Rippetoe describes: “…Col. Wilder was a little too sharp for
them…” 334 The rebels would continue to get their fill of Wilder and his Brigade’s Spencers for a
considerable time later. On Sept. 18th, the day before the official start of the battle, Wilder and
the Brigade had a desperate stand to hold a bridge and protect crossings over the Chickamauga
against what turned out to be the entire Rebel army. Sgt. James H. Barnes, Co. A, 72nd Indiana,
gave an account of the action from his section of the line:
“The company held its fire until the advancing enemy were so close that we
could see their eyes bat, then opened upon them with our Spencers, which belched such a
constant and awful stream of well-aimed balls that the rebels were completely surprised,
faltered, wavered, and then retreated. They soon reformed, deployed on the flanks, and
came at A’s position again, determined to flank and surround it. [We] punished the
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enemy so severely in front that they gave way the second time, but on the flanks he still
continued to advance”. 335

This action was later credited, on both sides, with allowing the Federals to contest the
efforts of Gen. Bragg and avoid a complete rout before the battle even began. The unit history
for the 17th Indiana also claims that, “The fire from the Spencer Rifle of Wilder’s men was so
terrible that, notwithstanding the enemy made frequent rushes to cross the bridge as they were
often repulsed”. 336 Falling back in the face of encirclement, Wilder called for aid and received
only vitriol and a dismissive attitude from Gen. Crittenden. As soon as the brigade Crittenden
sent in was repulsed and sent fleeing, Wilder turned to Col. Minty and remarked, “Well Colonel
Minty, the General has got his report”. 337 While Wilder quipped on the General’s requested
“report”, his men called after their Corps commander, “What do you think now? Do you think
we were scared of cavalry now? We told you so,” giving yet another instance of a general
ignoring the word of the Lighting Brigade at their own peril. 338 The battle was not even officially
joined and the Brigade was making a mark, but two days hard fight were still ahead.
In a letter home to his wife Sallie, Otho McManus wrote home on Sept 24th, 1863, wrote
of the battle, “by nine o’clock was opened one of the hottest battles ever known”. 339 While
accurate, it would prove to have been a near understatement about the carnage and scope of the
battle. Col. Wilder himself gave an account later of the battle’s first day at Vinard Field:
“As the rebels entered the field, in heavy masses fully exposed, the mounted
infantry, with their seven-shooting Spencer rifles, kept up a continuous blast of fire upon
them, while Lilly with his Indiana Battery, hurled through them double shotted canister
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from his ten-pounder rifles at less than three hundred yards. The effect was awful. Every
shot seemed to tell. The head of the column, as it pushed on by those behind, appeared to
melt away or sink into the earth, for though continually moving it got no nearer. It broke
at last, and fell back in great disorder. It was rallied and came on again, and with
desperate resolution pushed through the solid fire to the ditch. Here, all who could get it
took shelter. Instantly Lilly whirled two of his guns and poured right down the length of
the ditch his horrible double canister. Hardly a man got out alive.
When the firing ceased, one could have walked for two hundred yards down that
ditch on dead rebels, without ever touching the ground”. 340

From this scene comes the most famous quote from the Brigade on the battle: “At this
point it actually seemed a pity to kill men so. They fell in heaps, and I had it in my head to order
the firing to cease to end the awful sight”. 341 While things wavered elsewhere on the line, Wilder
and his Lightning Brigade were inflicting great carnage upon the enemy. Their new weapons and
direct action with Lilly’s 18th Indiana Battery worked to great effect, described by author Steven
Woodworth as a “gigantic sawed-off shotgun”. 342 This scene on the Vinard Field is also a good
early example of combined combat arms, infantry and artillery working in conjunction to great
effect. 343 After the action, Major Connolly of the 123rd IL wrote home to his wife, “We think our
Spencers saved us, and our men adore them as the heathen do their idols,” a rather pointed and
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rousing endorsement of the effect and powerful nature of their new repeaters. 344 While the day’s
action of September 19th had proved inconclusive for the armies as whole, the Lightning Brigade
had met with rousing success as the brutal carnage of a corpse and gore filled ditch would attest.
While the second day (Sept. 20th) would not go as well for the Union Army, the Lightning
Brigade continued to meet with their own successes.
September 20th is remembered as the day that the Union Army was nearly routed and
Gen. Thomas made his now famous “Rock of Chickamauga” stand in the North as the right wing
collapsed. What is forgotten is that the extreme right flank, Wilder’s Lighting Brigade, held and
helped to create the conditions that allowed Thomas to make his stand. Otho McManus describes
one of their successful charges as Gen. Sheridan’s Corps fell apart and his own brother’s
regiment was routed: “This would not do---so with a yell, the Brigade dashed into the woods at a
double-quick and opened on them with the Spencers at such a rate that they instantly broke and
such rebel skedaddling I never saw before; and I have seen several stampedes of rebs”. 345 The
unit history of the 17th by WHH Benefiel later recounts that at one point while the rest of the
wing was retreating, they were “charging the enemy and completely driving back their left down
Lee and Gordon’s Mill road. Taking two guns from the enemy, still loaded with canister, which
were emptied into their fleeing ranks”. 346 Following the infamous encounter with Asst. Sec. of
War Dana, the Brigade withdrew, and while many wrote of the incident then and later, an
unknown soldier of the 72nd Indiana wrote of the battle of the 20th, “…broke the right Wing and
cut our brigade and Jeneral (General) Stanlies (Stanley’s?) force of cavalry off from the rest of
our force but by good Jeneraling (Generaling) on the parts of our commanders We got back safe
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and saved two wagon trains…”. 347 Despite the disaster the battle had been, the Lighting Brigade
was still confident in their contribution and as Pvt. Alva Griest lamented later, “How I wish our
infantry could have been armed with Spencer Rifles today and all the forces of Rebels in dixie
could not have forced their way through our lines. We could repulse them easily every time, but
our infantry was overpowered by numbers”. 348 Col. Atkins of the 92nd IL, one of the regimental
Commanders at the time, said of Wilder: “He used his horses to transport his troops rapidly to
the point of engagement, and fought his men in line of foot. That had never been done before,
and in order to do it he invented his own tactics, and drilled his troops by the same commands on
foot and on horseback, and every army of every civilized country in the world has adopted the
tactics that Wilder invented. This is high praise, but Wilder deserves it”. 349 While he exaggerates
and is incorrect about world adoption of such tactics (which will be analyzed later), he was
correct as to the methods Wilder used for his Brigade. While the rest of the Army, exhausted and
beaten, crawled towards Chattanooga, Wilder’s Brigade defended the retreat, then proceeded
across the river to take up position to guard the crossings north of town, heading straight into
their next conflict: the Wheeler Raid.
When Wheeler crossed the river and began his attempt to cut Chattanooga off from
Nashville, Wilder’s men saw to it that it would not come to pass. Chasing them for nearly a
week, they finally caught up to them around Farmington, TN, where the Battle of Farmington
commenced and proved decisive in the raid. After a skirmish the day before, the Brigade met the
attack of the much larger force of rebels. Otho McManus recalled: “...after taking fire from a
fence 100yds ahead, We then let into them with our Spencers and soon they gave way---we went
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after with yell. Of course we whipped them. I have not learned our loss yet but it will be about
32=27 wounded and five killed---among the latter our dear Col. J. Monroe”. 350 McManus
conveys the confidence and high morale the Brigade still had following the morale-sapping
Battle of Chickamauga, and that their Commander Col. Monroe was a firm believer in and
demonstrated by leading from the front. Col. Miller, commander of the 17th IN and acting
commander of the Lighting Brigade following one of Wilder’s frequent bouts of illness, sent a
letter during the engagement following and order from his commanding General, Gen. George
Crook, to not engage the enemy: “General---at the time of receiving your order, to prevent an
engagement was impossible; the enemy would have attacked me had I not him. I have whipped
him and stampeded all his troops; have taken all four cannon and 300 prisoners, but not without
loss to my command. Col. Monroe of the 123rd Illinois, with two other officers, are among the
killed. Send forward medical aid as soon as possible”. 351 Matter-of-fact and to-the-point, this
report again displayed the brigade’s professionalism, and more importantly their skill, in the face
of superior numbers. This was probably one of the reasons Gen. Thomas credited them almost
singlehandedly with preventing the raid from having its desired effect. 352 In November 1863,
with Wilder again down for sick leave, the Brigade was split up into separate units: the 18th IN
Battery and 92nd IL departed and never returned, and the 17th IN and 98th IL served together for a
spell as did the 72nd IN and 123rd IL before they were reunited under Wilder in April 1864 for
Sherman’s Atlanta campaign. 353 But even though they were all still active during the period, of
this “Split”, they found more often than not other units simply didn’t conduct themselves in an
even remotely similar manner in combat.
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Col. Wilder, shortly after returning from sick leave, wrote on Jan 7th, 1864,
“I could enumerate a least thirty fights in which the ‘Spencer Rifle’ has triumphed over
other arms in such apparently overwhelming numbers so as to almost appear incredible.
They should be made with a ring on the side of the breech-piece so as to be carried as a
carbine. The ammunition being water-proof, is not worn out or destroyed like other kinds.
I believe that if the Government would arm ten thousand mounted infantry with these
guns, and put them under a good enterprising officer, they could destroy all principle
railroad lines in the South, and do more damage to the rebellion in three months than fifty
thousand troops ordinarily armed could do in a year. I wish I could see those having
authority in this matter, that I might impress upon them the great importance of using
these arms”. 354

Whether or not Wilder thought he was one such “enterprising officer” is irrelevant.
What’s important is that he could not fathom that after all he and his Brigade had accomplished
that the Spencer rifle was not ubiquitous for Union mounted forces. But Wilder was not the only
person astounded by actions of the government and military establishment. Instead, his men were
also finding reason to be shocked and disappointed. The 17th IN and the 98th IL on the morning
of December 27th, 1863 were forced to cover their current command’s retreat following a
surprise attack by rebel cavalry. 355 The sticking point for the former Lightning Brigade members
was that it all could have been avoided; their Brigade commander and staff had ignored reports
from pickets of the 17th that the enemy was nearby. 356 The 17th IN’s men still remembered this
shameful display after the war enough to remark on it in their unit’s history:
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“The consequence was a disgraceful stampede took place, and I will here say that any of
Wilder’s men was ever a party to; this all on account of the lack of diligence on the part
of the officers in camp, as they had ample warning hours before the approach of the
enemy…Well we got out of that scrape by the skin of our teeth, but we have always since
believed that…we could have cleaned out that rebel force, consisting only, as we learned,
of small brigade under command of General Kelly”. 357

The men of the 17th IN and the 98th IL were accustomed to better officering and more
steadfast companions, and their level of unit cohesion shines through from these frustrations.
They were very tight-knit, arguably on par with specialty and special operations units today,
certainly with modern infantry units, and unenthused about fighting with sub-par regiments. And
they weren’t the only former brigade regiments running into this problem. The 72nd IN and 123rd
IL, while on an expedition under General Sooy Smith in January of 1864, had a similar
experience. In a letter to the Commander of the 72nd IN, “…You were run over by four regiments
of your brigade in the morning, in a perfect stampede; yet, nothing abashed, you waited to fight
rather than follow those who were retreating”. 358 Once again the Lightning Brigade’s old
regiments stood their ground rather than scamper off into the trees. Luckily, all four regiments
would soon be reunited under Wilder in time for the Atlanta campaign on April 8th, 1864. 359
Early in the campaign, prior to any major combat by the Brigade or Northern army as a whole,
word reached them of the Fort Pillow massacre. Otho McManus wrote home to his wife about
the unit’s feelings on it: “Ever since the massacre at Fort Pillow our boys are anxious to get a
chance at For[r]est[‘]s Bloodhounds and if we ever do meet, they may expect the mercy they
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gave our boys at Ft. Pillow, doubled and twisted”. 360 This incident may explain actions by the
brigade a year later, when confronting Forrest and his men in Alabama. Rather than making
calculated and cautious decisions against the butchers of Fort Pillow, they charged headlong at
them. But there was still plenty of combat until the “last western battle of any consequence”
outside of Selma, AL. 361
The Wilder Brigade continued to be in the thick of things wherever they happened to be
assigned as part of Sherman’s push on Atlanta. On Jun 8th, 1864, around Big Shanty, GA, in an
attack commanded by Col. Miller (acting Brigade Commander),
“driving the enemy’s skirmishers back through a skirt of timber to his main line,
which was formed in open ground, and was protected by a heavy barricade of logs and
rails… [I] ordered the whole line forward and carried the enemy’s line of works, he
falling back to another similar line 400 yards in rear of the first. Following him up, under
galling fire, I succeeded in driving him from this line also, from which he fell back to a
third line of works, on the opposite side of the railroad…Again the enemy was driven
from his works and retired slowly to his fourth line, 200 yds. in rear of the third. Here he
made a still more determined stand than at either of his former positions, but I at once
ordered a charge, and the line responding promptly, carried the works, while the enemy
fled precipitately, leaving his dead and wounded in my hands…”. 362

This was yet another example of their rapid maneuvers and effective assaults. Several
days later when their oft-sister brigade of Minty’s cavalry was imperiled, the Lighting Brigade
was ordered up. Otho McManus remembers:

McManus, Morning to Midnight in the Saddle, 176.
Sunderland, Lightning at Hoover’s Gap, 201.
362
McManus, Morning to Midnight in the Saddle, 186.
360
361

75
“Minty’s cavalry became engaged with a large force of the enemy and were
getting the worst of it when our Brigade was ordered out on foot to help him out of the
scrape, and we were not a minute too soon, for we engaged the rebels and held them in
check till Col. Minty got his horses back over the creek, which he did, while we fought
the rebs. We got back to camp safe an hour after dark…” 363

And so continued the Brigade’s excellent effect against cavalry as they prevented disaster
wherever they were present. Later during the campaign, the men learned, “From what prisoners
tell us they would rather capture us and our Spencers then five times our number from any other
command”. 364 While Otho McManus did not indicate any fears because of it, I would suggest it
to be the ultimate compliment: the Lightning Brigade had such devastating effect on the
Southern Army that they would do anything to remove it, though it would also seem they were
never up to the task. As the campaign ended and Sherman prepped for his now famous March to
the Sea, the Wilder Brigade, having lost their namesake commander for the final time to a
medical discharge, moved north to Louisville, KY to remount and reequip before proceeding east
with General Wilson for his raid into Alabama from Gravely Springs. 365 This raid would
culminate in the Battle of Selma and mark one of the last serious engagements of the war.
The Battle of Selma would mark one of the bloodier engagements the Lightning Brigade
participated in. The raid had been fairly one-sided until the Battle of Ebenezer’s Church, where a
fantastic yet foolish charge by members of the 17th nearly ended General Forrest’s journey as
Otho McManus had promised earlier in the war. 366 The Battle of Selma itself was a victory for
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the Brigade and the rest of the Corps but it was a pitched encounter. Captain Wiley, of the 123rd
IL, stated on the battle:
“…at General Long’s, ‘Forward’, the entire line started up with a bound, yelling,
shooting and all pushing forward under terrific cannonade and through a perfect storm of
bullets, losing officer and men at every step, until we cleared the high picket fence,
crossed the ditch, and scaled the high earthworks…When we struck and scaled the works
the Rebels, who had fought us so desperately as to club their guns on some of our
men…”. 367

Capt. Wiley was quoted elsewhere as stating, “…planted the regimental standard first of
any command on the works of Selma”. 368 Alva Griest wrote of the difficulty of the assault: “But
invincible courage and Spencer Rifles will accomplish anything; and a portion of their line was
discovered to waver and our boys were quick to take advantage of it and rushed forward with
irresistible force”. 369 George Sandoe, cousin of Otho McManus (who was killed in the assault),
wrote that during the follow-on assault when they drove the Rebels back through Selma:
“Many of the rebels in their flight, in attempting to cross the river and a deep
stream east of the city, were drowned. They imagined we would show them no quarters,
as Forrest has long threatened the 2nd Division a terrible chastisement. Poor fellows! They
paid dearly for their threats of showing no quarters. They, expecting none from us, lost
their lives in a vain attempt to escape across the river”. 370

George Sandoe made the observation that others have made many times: do unto others
as you would have them do unto you. The men under Forrest’s command had shown no quarter
at Fort Pillow and they drowned trying to flee the same fate. Col. Miller spoke later on the battle:
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“…and the history of the war will not show another instance where such formidable works, well
manned and defended with men and artillery, have been stormed and captured by a single line of
men without support”. 371 Miller pointed out one of the keys features of the battle: while yes, the
men were assaulting a well-entrenched position, with artillery sites and strong works, they had
assaulted it without any possibility of support, as all other units were engaged in the assault or in
the vicinity but out of range of the battle in the event of trouble. The Brigade’s tenacity won the
day and led to one final major victory. While the war was not officially over, the end was near
and the large scale engagements were over for the Brigade. The 17th IN’s unit history comments
later on the “brotherly love” they felt for the 72nd IN, as well as the 98th and 123rd IL regiments
as they departed for home, a bond they would share for many years after. 372 As author Glenn
Sunderland well states: “They were proud of their service and had a right to be…there wasn’t a
man in the army, Confederate or Union, who hadn’t heard of the exploits of Wilder’s
Brigade”. 373 But had the Brigade left it all on the field of battle? And what would their reputation
actually be, along with their actual effect on warfare?
XI. The Chickamauga Decision
Following the war, General John T. Wilder (retired) had much success and good relations
with many former army members, Federal and Rebel alike. These good relations helped him in
running down details on his one regret from the war: the withdrawal on the second day of
Chickamauga, or “The Chickamauga Decision” as I will call it. Many sources recount that
Wilder had observed the deteriorating situation on the Federal’s right wing and had tried to rally
support. Finding it not forthcoming, he had organized his command and sought to attack through
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Gen. Longstreet’s left flank to link up with Gen. Thomas and possibly roll back the rebels. 374
However, Wilder never made the maneuver, instead pulling out, exiting the battlefield in good
order, protecting Thomas’ flank in the process until he could withdraw from Snodgrass Hill. 375
Why had he opted against his plan? Wilder himself said after the war:
“I had decided to cut our way through Bragg’s Army on Sunday to join Thomas
on Snodgrass Hill, and was only prevented from attempting it by peremptory orders from
Charles A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, who, having lost his way to Chattanooga,
had just come up as I was forming the Brigade in five lines, columns of regiments to
make the charge which I firmly believe would have resulted successfully. I would have
struck them inflank and rear five lines of Spencer Rifles in the hands of the steadiest body
of men I ever saw”. 376

What actually happened is the source of some debate and contention.
None of the sources contest the fact that Wilder hesitated to leave the field despite being
cut off. One describes it as he was trying to reform when he was ordered off the field by General
Sheridan and then Asst. Sec. War Dana. 377 Another describes a “bold” plan that Sec. Dana
“wrecked” and forced the Brigade to leave the field, albeit unbeaten. 378 Other sources give a far
more elaborate plan and explanation of the Sec. Dana encounter. Wilder’s plan was quite “bold”;
never considering to simply leave the field, Wilder devised a formation with his five regiments
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(17th IN, 72nd IN, 98th IL, 123rd IL, and 92nd IL) and Lilly’s 18th IN Battery that resembled a
hollow box (two regiments in the front, one on each side, and one to the rear) with the Battery in
the middle. 379 Wilder was alleged to have said to Col. Atkins of the 92nd IL that he planned on,
“charging with his brigade through the center of the Confederate Column, taking regiments in
flank and pushing for Thomas on the left,” to which Col. Atkins claimed: “I replied to him that it
was a desperate and bold movement, but that Wilder’s brigade of Spencer rifles could do it. 380
Author Richard Baumgartner notes the after-action reports do not support this claim 381, but
letters and accounts later do support that there was such a plan. John M. King noted in his Diary
that Wilder had a bold plan of “putting through the rebel lines and fighting his way straight down
to Thomas,” and that they were forming to do so. 382 Col. Atkins would later claim the same plan
was in motion. 383 While the attempted maneuver did not make later reports that is not reason to
discount the story as false; if anything, it helps, because you don’t report on what you wanted to
do, you report on what you did. It would be logical to assume Wilder simply reported on what
occurred and made no effort to throw more blame “down the pipe” for what might have been.
But if Wilder had been forming his men for an attack, why had it not been carried out? As
Wilder himself stated after the fact, he withdrew on the orders of Asst. Sec. War Dana. This is
confirmed by nearly every source, but presents a significant problem in military
discipline. 384Anyone who has served in the US military knows that civilians, no matter their
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station, do not give orders to military officers; the President (Commander-in-Chief) commands
the generals who give the orders. This is true now and was true long before the Civil War, and
the rules still applied then. Sec. Dana’s own recollection bears out that he had no authority to
give orders, which would run counter to the claims of Wilder and Atkins after the war. 385 Sec.
Dana’s memoir is, however, the only source that does not claim Dana gave orders, and presents
himself as calm in the face of fire. All other sources convey a very excited and agitated man
riding up without a hat, and King recollected very specifically that Dana, when consulted on the
attack, “gave positive orders not to do so”. 386 While Atkins and Wilder had claimed publically
after the war that Dana had issued orders, the recollection of one of the soldiers to this very fact
proves their claims are not unfounded. I will however note that Sec. Dana’s account lies about
only on whether he issued orders; the rest of his account lacked truth by being very vague and
omitted many details, like his claims of a rout, Rosecrans’s death, and the need for an escort
which was given by the Brigade. 387 It is worth mentioning that this would have been only the
second time in history that a civilian gave orders to a military officer in a combat situation, the
first having been James Monroe at the Battle of Bladensburg during the War of 1812. 388 That
fact alone makes this occurrence momentous in its near lack of precedence. Some may try to
argue that Col. Wilder should then have known that the orders he was being given were illegal
and should have been ignored, but author Glenn Tucker points out that it would have been
unnerving for a Colonel to countermand a government official, and that if he had had a star or
two on his shoulder he would have been more certain in countermanding the Secretary who had
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overstepped his brief. 389 It should also be pointed out that the battle had turned into a near rout
and Wilder certainly didn’t want to be on the radar of the Sec. Stanton’s spy, 390 who had the
inside connection to Washington and a reputation as an “imbecile”, as Col. Atkins put it. 391 It
would have seemed prudent to a field officer to avoid having himself remembered negatively by
the War Secretary’s man, so Wilder naturally felt compelled to obey. Wilder assigned scouts to
escort the Asst. Sec. to safety, and whether “angrily” or “sullenly”, began his withdrawal from
the field. 392 Whether dawdling or being outright defiant, Wilder and his Brigade did slow the
pullout to collect abandoned and captured guns, as well as ambulances, wagon trains, and
stragglers so that they safely cleared the pass to make their way to Chattanooga. 393 Orders from a
legitimate source finally arrived from Gen. Thomas, who learned of Wilder’s still organized
body and asked him to hold position to protect the flank, basically what Wilder had opted to do
of his own volition. 394 At the time, the questions of ‘what if?’ were not relevant. The battle was
over and the army was at risk or on the run depending on your perspective, but once the war
ended and the generals were left with nothing then to command from their parlors did the
speculation and analysis begin.
John T. Wilder swore to his dying day that his plan would have succeeded if he had been
allowed to attempt it. 395 While many an officer will make claims about their career, Wilder
uniquely set out to prove it. While Wilder had been told by Gen. Thomas that his actions had
been instrumental in allowing him to make his stand and saved the army from annihilation,
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Wilder was still concerned with his audacious plan. 396 Author Glenn Tucker advances the idea
that Wilder could have made his assault with six regiments (the 39th IN was in the area and in
good order, and similarly equipped) and attacked straight into Longstreet’s rear. 397 While the
ultimate outcome may not have changed, this would have been a radical change for the results of
the battle, even against all odds if it had been successful. Imagine, if you will, Longstreet routs
one Federal wing only to have his flank smashed and turned by the Lighting Brigade and its
Spencer Repeating Rifles. The war’s course would certainly have been different. But that still
doesn’t answer whether or not it would have worked. Wilder was adamant in his past desire,
“…to make the charge which I firmly believe would have resulted successfully. 398 Wilder was
adamant that he had walked the field with many an “ex-rebel” and claimed they agreed that he
would have “been fatal Bragg’s Army”. 399 Longstreet had told Wilder after the war that his
attack prior to his run-in with Sec. Dana had made so much racket that he thought a fresh corps
had assailed him and he had delayed his attack. 400 Col. Atkins, was cited often as being very
positive of the plan and believed it would have succeeded. 401 John M. King, also of the 92nd,
stated afterwards in his diary: “Wilder was bold and daring and would have succeeded, and the
fortunes of that battle might have been different. Dana was [a] coward and had authority at a
time when he should have had no authority,” further evidence that the men were at least
motivated enough to give it full effort, and that the Secretary had overstepped his brief. 402 The
final endorsement of Wilder’s plan comes from one of his fellow Hoosiers, Sgt. George S.
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Wilson of the 17th IN: Responding to a letter where Wilder claims he would have been
successful, which he refers to “sanguine expectations”, Wilson noted that at that point the
Brigade was in top form and while it is pointless to speculate on the past, “I firmly believe it
would have succeeded”. 403 While it’s not clear whether the “sanguinary expectations” refer to
what the Brigade would have inflicted, or received in kind, it is clear that the plan would have
achieved what Wilder intended, smashing through to Thomas. While Sgt. Wilson correctly
points out that it is pointless to speculate only because you cannot be wholly certain, there is one
aspect we can be sure of about the battle: “…but by good Jeneraling [generaling] on the parts of
our commanders We got back safe…”. 404 The number one item on any good commander’s mind
after completing objectives is the safety of his troops, and Wilder succeeded immensely. While
the debate on the Chickamauga Decision can continue with relish, the post war opinions of the
Brigade were already settled.
XII. Opinions on the Lightning Brigade after the War
While Wilder’s Lightning Brigade would never have the fame associated with it like the
North’s Iron Brigade or the South’s Stonewall Brigade, they still had fame among those who
knew of them. Wilder himself ended up in Tennessee around Chattanooga after the war, having
been “impressed” by the area and its mineral wealth. 405 His efforts at study on the Battle of
Chickamauga were aided by the high esteem which he was held locally, both with Northern and
Southern factions, winning over supporters and burying animosities. 406 It would certainly seem
that a great war hero, even from the other side, would be impressive because of the same skill
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and drive that won him accolades in the war in would translate into his civilian endeavors.
Wilder even had good relations with a man to whom he often was compared, General Nathaniel
Bedford Forrest. 407 While historians examine and debate their similarities and whether-or-not
Wilder was inspired by Forrest’s tactics (or at least his actions), both were held in extremely high
regard by opposing officers and biographers. 408 Because of these comparisons, it would actually
come as no surprise that they had an encounter after the war. Forrest was in trouble with
authorities and threatened with jail-time during Reconstruction, at which point Wilder stepped in
a prevented his incarceration. 409 While this encounter proved no more than respect for former
adversaries, it would be logical to assume that they discussed past engagements they were both
involved in, including Chickamauga. 410 Wilder continued work on examining the Battle of
Chickamauga for a number of years after the war, but he was not the only brigade member that
looked back at this battle in particular.
Colonel Smith D. Atkins of the 92nd Illinois Volunteer Infantry Regiment (later Mounted
Infantry Regiment), despite only briefly fighting under Wilder as part of the Lightning Brigade,
did have many thoughts to make on their one major engagement together, Chickamauga. 411 At a
Women’s Relief Corps event in 1907, Col. Atkins discussed the wartime service of the Brigade
and Wilder, describing Union soldiers to the assembly: “The soldiers who saved the Republic
were citizen soldiers, the best soldiery in the world and it will always be so while the Republic
shall endure”. 412 While obviously speaking in platitudes for the assembled crowd, Atkins
continued on to describe the battle, and the incident were Wilder suggested an attack on the

407

Williams, “General John T. Wilder”, 202.
Ibid, 195-197.
409
Williams, “General John T. Wilder”, 202-203.
410
Ibid, 202.
411
Atkins, “Chickamauga: Useless, Disastrous Battle”, 3.
412
Ibid, 6.
408

85

enemy Corps’ rear on the second day of battle, and how Sec. Dana called it off. 413 Atkins’
description of the “sullen” withdrawal by Wilder underscored Wilder’s attitude as a fighter and
the crushing effect a pullout order had on him. 414 Despite describing in length the bravery of
both his men, the Brigade’s and the armies’, he described the battle as “useless” and a waste of
life, as it was a defeat and led to a retreat from the field. 415 While Atkins still held on to his
distaste for Rosecrans after the war, he held Wilder in very high regard, mentioning the proposed
assault on the enemy rear. While it did not come to pass, Atkins never missed a chance to
compliment his former commander. But fellow officers were not the only people paying
compliments to Wilder or the Brigade.
While not well known outside of historical circles, the Lightning Brigade garners some of
the best compliments and descriptions of any unit from the war. Author and Historian Richard A.
Baumgartner includes a Forward in his book from Wiley Sword who describes the Lightning
Brigade as “a misnomer”, stating he believes that a more proper title would be “the war’s killer
elite”, which certainly has a more direct and useful description of their service record on the
whole. 416 Historian and Civil War weapons expert Joseph G. Bilby remarks on Wilder, “Some
commanders of Spencer armed troops, like Colonel Wilder, appear to have quickly learned to
exercise considerable fire control while at the same time applying their available firepower at the
proper tactical moment”. 417 An important adaptation in tactics, which Wilder once again needs to
be mentioned and credited for. Historian Glenn W. Sunderland gives a twofold assessment of the
brigade, first crediting “modern cavalry principles developed by Lightning Brigade” for their
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successes and trend-setting for future wars, and of the Brigade members: “They were proud of
their service and they had a right to be…there wasn’t a man in the army, Confederate or Union,
who hadn’t heard of the exploits of Wilder’s Brigade”. 418 While an issue to be discussed in the
next section, it would be remiss to not acknowledge the effect on modern cavalry tactics the
Brigade had, and it’s important to note that at the time the unit was well-known in the Western
Armies. But while it’s easy for modern historians to attach ideas and labels to a conflict over a
hundred years concluded, it has a basis in the words of the men themselves. In the official unit
history, published and approved by the 17th Indiana Regimental Association in 1912, the unit
made two claims for history that should tell any reader how the men of the 17th IN, and arguably
the brigade as a whole, felt about their wartime service: “We boast of having accomplished more
with the least loss of life than any other regiment in the service” and “We ask our country to give
us the credit of our actions. We never were defeated”. 419 Almost 50 years after the war and the
brigade members were still confident in their victories and their unit’s record. Their boast about
accomplishing more with less loss is important due to many units making a name for themselves
by taking grievous casualties, though the credit for not be defeated needs a bit of qualification.
They were present for defeats but their unit never fled the field in disarray, only withdrawing on
several occasions, often after waiting for orders to do so. So while reputations and records are
always open for review in history, the record of Wilder’s Lightning Brigade remains positive,
because it is hard to argue with the results. But exactly how did this unit manage to become so
accomplished, what was their actual record and how does it compare to others?
XIII. The Lightning Brigade’s Combat Record
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As mentioned in the previous section, the Brigade was very proud of their combat record
and adamant that they were never defeated. It is an interesting claim when placed next to a list of
the Brigade’s battles (listed earlier in Unit History section), as some of the larger ones were
recorded historically as being calamitous Union defeats, such as Chickamauga. Others had the
issue of being “smaller skirmishes unrecorded outside of local historians”. 420 Luckily, the unit’s
histories, diaries and letters from the men, and later work on the Brigade, collects all such
information together into a comprehensible list. While this makes it difficult to get and exact
“sport stat” list of their engagements (losses, losses inflicted, results of engagement), accounts of
their various activities can give us a more complete look as to their effectiveness. The first
engagement that can be described, actually one of their first and fought well prior to their being
issued Spencer Rifles, was the Battle of Cheat Mountain, where Wilder describes his men’s stand
and being “only regiment to remain in order” in their efforts. 421 This October 3rd, 1861
engagement resulted in the 17th Indiana suffering 10 KIA, 15 WIA, while inflicting 38 enemy
KIA and capturing 14, a result Wilder partly attributes to poor work by the enemy artillery in
preparing their shells. 422 While not a reflection of the entire Brigade, it is proof that their later
successes weren’t entirely dependent on their new Spencers.
The next well documented engagement, and one of their greatest victories of the war, was
the Battle of Hoover’s Gap. An undisputed victory for the recently mounted and repeater-armed
Wilder Brigade, it was the most tellingly lopsided victory for the unit, suffering 61 casualties and
inflicting 146 casualties on the enemy. 423 While not an absolute drubbing, those are still rather
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lopsided figures if you consider Wilder was outnumbered and the great difficulty in knowing
exactly how many enemy wounded left the field before the engagement concluded, and
acknowledge that the new technology was getting its first large-scale debut. From here the
campaign moved past Chattanooga and towards the inevitable conflict at Chickamauga, where in
the days leading up to the climactic battle the Lightning Brigade found themselves engaged in
what would later be labelled the Battle of Rocks Springs. On the 12th of September, Wilder was
able to fight/sneak his way out of encirclement without the enemy crushing his cut off unit. 424
The other astounding fact, other than his deceptive campfires and night march out of the
encirclement, was that he again inflicted lopsided casualties on the enemy: 30 KIA/WIA
suffered, 50 KIA/WIA inflicted. 425 While these engagements are positive marks in anyone’s
record keeping, the Brigade next moment of distinction was overshadowed by the fact that the
Battle of Chickamauga was nearly a rout and was a severe loss for the North.
The trickiest part of analyzing the Brigade’s actions in the Battle of Chickamauga
(Sept.19th-20th) is that at the time it was impossible for the Brigade to get an accurate idea of the
casualties they inflicted. They were forced to withdraw the day prior despite inflicting great
damage and delay on the enemy. Then in the first day of battle they covered the same space of
field several times, fighting until dark but being unable to retrieve even their own casualties due
to sniper fire. Finally, on the second day they were repositioned, remained the only undefeated
Brigade on the right and after initially charging into the enemy flank and rear, and eventually had
be easier than wounded to confirm. Baumgartner, Blue Lightning, 88, mentions that the rebels lost “25% of men
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Sunderland, Lightning at Hoover’s Gap, 43, has the figures 51 KIA/WIA for Wilder and inflicting 200+ casualties on
the enemy, which is close to the other figures but deviates slightly on the actual figures from on Wilder’s men.
424
Sunderland, Lightning at Hoover’s Gap, 62-64.
425
Williams, “General John T. Wilder”, 188. Again, while sources do agree on rough number of Wilder casualties,
vary wildly, with 50 being the lower number. Baumgartner, Blue Lightning, 88, claims anywhere from 50-82
casualties, with several in between. Rowell, Yankee Artillerymen, 83, claims under 20 casualties for the Brigade,
but firm on the 50 KIA/WIA for the enemy.

89

to withdraw from the field. 426 The Lightning Brigade’s first day’s efforts (Sept. 18th, one day
prior to the “official” start of the battle) involved an attempt to hold Alexander’s Bridge and
several other crossings from the rebels; the force Wilder commanded was reduced to about 1000
men 427 due to loaning portions to Col. Minty’s forces to his north and the entire 92nd IL being
away on other duties. 428 While holding for half the day before being compelled to withdraw due
to overwhelming opposition and advancing flanking forces (estimate 8000 enemy soldiers
attacking his section of the line alone) 429, Wilder’s men managed to withdraw in good order and
with only one casualty to the enemy’s 105. 430 Most modern historians and even generals at the
time credited this action with saving the army from piece-meal annihilation, due to the hours
Wilder and Minty delayed Gen. Bragg allowed Gen. Rosecrans to consolidate and deploy his
forces. 431 While these figures do not account for the night engagement at Vinard road, Wilder
opened up with a devastating tally against the enemy.
The next day, the first day of the battle, was decidedly more chaotic and gory than the
previous one for both sides. The battle along Wilder’s section at West Vinard Field across
LaFayette Road was as bloody stalemate, though to be fair it would have been a Union rout if not
for Wilder’s actions. The fighting around Vinard field on the 19th was described as a “seething
arena” or that the line position “ebbed and flowed”, as the Rebels would push the Union forces
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back across the road and field, only for Wilder’s men to push them back over the road again in
return. 432 This continued throughout the day, with no overall change in their positions and
remaining the same by nightfall. 433 While the day’s results were inconclusive, Wilder’s
Lightning Brigade presumably inflicted a great number of casualties on the enemy. This
conclusion can be drawn from the multiple occasions that day of repelling determined Rebel
advances, advances that were characterized by “their infernal Rebel yell”, but the Rebel attacks
became “so thin it virtually disappeared”, testament to the carnage a line of Spencer Rifles could
do to massed infantry. 434 The most telling indicator of Rebel casualties from the day’s
engagements centered on the afternoon attack by Gen. Hoods’ forces. Due to the heavy fire
being put down by the Spencers, the Rebel soldiers clustered up in a large ditch just across the
road and “obstinately” clung to that position. 435 Wilder, in a stroke of genius that demonstrated
an effective use of an attached artillery battery, ordered Capt. Lilly to take a section with 4
companies of the 17th to a position on a spur that overlooked the ditch. 436 This enfilading fire
caused one of the most effective, but goriest, scenes of the battle. The combined canister fire (at
this point “treble” or triple loaded) was utterly devastating to the men in the ditch, raking it from
end-to-end. 437 The carnage in the ditch was nearly indescribable Capt. Lilly later remarked “At
this point it actually seemed a pity to kill men so. They fell in heaps; and I had it in my heart to
order the firing to cease, to end the awful sight”. 438 This was an accurate portrayal of the effect
what canister fire can have on men at seven-350 yards. The Rebels finally retreated, leaving a
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scene of butchery that was so severe that Henry Campbell, bugler of the 18th Indiana Battery,
stated that the hundreds of dead and wounded in the ditch made it possible to walk from end to
end and never touch the ground, so “carnage-filled” was the ravine. 439 A charge had finally
compelled the Rebels to leave their choice of false shelter and the position changed hands several
times before it ended up in a no-man’s land during the night, making an official tally for the
engagement impossible. 440 While Wilder’s Brigade did not have an official tally just for the first
day and the official Rebel tally for the engagement was and is impossible to determine due to the
chaotic nature of the attack, we can make several inferences. The first is that several hundred
rebels met their fates in that ditch/ravine along the road, and that the sheer number was shocking
both due to its morbid nature and the sheer volume of men in the ditch, suggesting (though not
exactly proving) that the Brigade had suffered nowhere near that many casualties in the
engagement. It should also be noted that this was during one of nearly half a dozen major
assaults throughout the day, and while they evidently did not reach the pitch that the ravine
encounter did, each time Wilder’s Brigade drove off the rebel force in front of them to rescue
fleeing Union forces and drive the Rebels back across the field. 441 While numbers are tough to
assign with the lack of data available, we can interpolate that the casualties, as Wilder’s Brigade
was able to hold off and repel a number of attacks throughout the day and still remain online for
the following day’s conflict, were low for Wilder and extremely high for the Rebels confronting
them. While this day had been decisively positive for the Wilder Brigade, the day’s result for the
Armies was inconclusive.
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The final day of Chickamauga would go down in history as one of disaster for the Union
Army, but also that Gen. Thomas had prevented a total rout with his stand at Snodgrass Hill,
earning him the nickname “The Rock of Chickamauga”. Despite this the Wilder Brigade, while
certainly present throughout the disaster, was not touched by the panic and defeat that gripped
the other units. There was only one way to describe the action on the Union right on the 20th of
September, 1863, and that is a panicked rout. 442 While the rest of the wing ran for Chattanooga,
abandoning equipment and their fellows, Wilder’s Brigade attacked, smashing into the Rebel
Brigade under Gen. Manigault and driving them from the field before repelling their three
counter-attacks, reclaiming the captured 1st Missouri Battery and sending 220 prisoners to the
rear with the 39th Indiana Mounted Infantry, who had also joined them in their stand. 443 Wilder’s
men added needed confusion on Gen. Longstreet’s left flank and forced him to delay his attack
towards the north as he needed to rid himself of an organized force to his flank and in his rear. 444
Wilder realized the predicament, but rather then flee for fear of being surrounded, resolved to
attack through Gen. Longstreet’s line and join Gen. Thomas to the north. 445 The plan was bold,
brash, but not to be, as Wilder’s encounter with Secretary Dana ensured. Wilder spent most of
the day fighting but by the early evening was forced to withdraw himself from the field. 446 The
final day’s disaster weighs heavily against the Brigade’s claims of never being defeated, but
when we look at the Brigade’s experience on the field that day, they routed and repelled enemy
Brigades, recaptured full batteries, and captured over 200 prisoners which were sent rearward
(with assistance from the 39th IN). They maintained cohesion throughout and only left the field
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under orders and in good order. While the battle itself was a defeat for the Union Army, the
Lightning Brigade was untouched by the stain of defeat, recalling only the positive efforts they
made on the engagements. In that sense the battle was a tactical victory for the Brigade, even if
they were unable to contribute to any strategic goals from the campaign. So while the rest of the
army streamed back to Chattanooga in tatters and confusion, the Brigade rode back into town
and across the pontoons to cover river crossings in the vicinity of Chattanooga to prevent
encirclement. 447
In the month following the defeat at Chickamauga, the Lightning Brigade was kept busy
chasing down a rebel cavalry raid under General Wheeler, CSA. 448 Normally these raids had had
a devastating impact on the Union supply chain, but Wilder and his Brigade were uniquely
qualified to track them down. 449 They relentlessly pursued and nipped at the heels of the rebel
force, who was forced to move too fast to accomplish anything substantial. 450 Finally, on Oct 7th,
1863, the Lightning Brigade caught up with General Wheeler around Farmington, TN and routed
them, driving them through town in a blind panic in under 15 min. 451 The casualty figures for the
battle were 13 KIA, 79 WIA for the Lightning Brigade. 452 However, they inflicted 100 KIA, 150
WIA, captured 4 artillery pieces and captured 300 men, a horribly lopsided encounter. 453 Gen.
Wheeler escaped with roughly half his force but the Lightning Brigade had ridden hard for 9
days, over 300 miles, fought in 3 skirmishes and 1 pitched battle and cost Wheeler half his force,
making the whole operation a resounding success for the Lightning Brigade. 454 The remainder of
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the year was slower for the Lightning Brigade and they were split up in November until April of
1864 when Wilder went home on sick leave. 455 Each section of the Brigade (now consisting of
the 17th IN, 72nd IN, 98th IL, and 123rd IL) had poor experiences under other commanders, but
never were routed or forced to retreat, though they did each on one occasion have to cover a
withdrawal to prevent a rout. 456 Many other skirmishes occurred during the Atlanta campaign,
including the Battles of Big Shanty (casualties not specified), and Noonday Creek (command
suffered 67 casualties in all, enemy suffered 94 dead and 351 wounded), each time meeting
success despite tough opponents and difficult conditions (including one near monsoon
rainstorm). 457 While present at the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain, it is unclear whether they
participated in the failed assault or simply manned the trenches as they had been during other
operations. 458 The remainder of the larger skirmishes and battles the Brigade participated in 1864
were successful, though some came as part of operations that resulted in failure and the victory
came from the Lightning Brigade’s ability to escape from certain capture. 459 In November 1864
they turned over their mounts to Gen. Sherman’s cavalry for their use during the “March to The
Sea” and the men returned to Louisville to reequip and re-horse. 460 But the war was not yet over
for the men of the Lightning Brigade, and they had one mark still to leave on history.
The Lightning Brigade, while often under differing division level commanders, always
fought well for them as long as the brigade fought together. Their final operation under Gen.
James H. Wilson, termed the Wilson Raid, was no exception. They marched south and attacked
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southern arsenals in Alabama before moving towards Selma and then toward Macon, GA. 461
Skirmishing all the way down to attack Selma directly, they neared the city on April 1st. There, at
what would be called The Battle of Ebenezer’s Church, the Brigade met with victory against
their old foe General Nathaniel Bedford Forrest. 462 According to Alva C. Griest, the losses for
their command totaled 70-80 men, while the Rebels had lost 3 guns and 389 men captured. 463
While it lacks further information on other casualties for the Rebels (for example, wounded and
killed are not mentioned and Gen. Forrest was documented to have been seriously wounded), it
does show a very lopsided result regardless. The next day the Lightning Brigade, along with the
rest of Gen. Wilson’s command, successfully assaulted and took Selma. It was noted that this
engagement for the Lightning Brigade was notably deadly, losing slightly more than 20 percent
of the men engaged due to assaulting a fortified position directly. 464 Despite this, Griest noted
that casualties inflicted on the enemy also seemed to be “grievous”, having broken through a
wavering point in the defenses and accomplished the task in under an hour. 465 This was another
victory for the Lightning Brigade, but one that ran into one of the earlier examples of trench
warfare that, while successful, demonstrated the future challenges they offered. Despite this, and
many other challenges that the Brigade faced, they were successful and succeeded where others
failed. But was it solely the providence of repeating rifle usage or the mounting of the Brigade
that led to victory, or did the men’s background also figure into the successes of the Brigade?
XIV. The Brigade’s Men: Social and Anthropological Background
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One striking fact about the Civil War is that while it was fought between Americans from
the North and the South, there were far more groups involved then two simple geographic labels
do them justice. A military historian describes these differences as such: “Thus, whereas the
‘typical’ Eastern Federal is imagines as a Boston bank clerk—a tidy-minded urban teetotaler—
and the ‘typical’ Eastern Rebel is imagined as a Virginian from one of the better families, the
Westerners of both sides are as big-boned, loose-limbed farm hands”. 466 He further elaborates
saying, “There is a no-nonsense health and robustness about them which admits no role for the
closed theoretical systems (whether actuarial or genealogical) of Easterners”. 467 He closes by
describing how the men of the West had little time for “European Values” that the East clung to,
and were less enthralled by, drill and appearance than their Eastern-counterparts. 468 These
descriptions of the Western soldier are striking and important in describing the men of the
Lightning Brigade, soldiers of Indiana and Illinois. Griffith claims they were mostly farm-hands,
that they genetically and “actuarially” different from their Eastern counterparts, no-nonsense and
not bound to European tradition, arguably a common trait for men who were not part of the
former colonial regions. This description would go hand-in-hand with historian H.C.B. Rogers’
description of Southern soldiers having great respect for two northern groups, the Irish and the
Midwesterners. 469 This sentiment and theory would go along well with the previous comments
by Southerners about how the Midwestern men of the North fought much better than their
Eastern counterparts. While we can confidently claim that both the Midwestern soldiers
themselves and the Southerners they faced counted them as superior to the Eastern soldiers, what
sets them apart (if anything) from their fellow Midwesterners?
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The best way to examine the differences of the Lightning Brigade’s regiments from other
regiments, we should start by looking at each unit’s muster location and the type of men that
filled their ranks. The units of the Brigade were the 17th IN, 72nd IN, 18th IN Battery, 92nd IL, 98th
IL, and 123rd IL, whose stories were very similar. The 17th Indiana Volunteer Infantry Regiment
was mustered at Camp Morton, Indianapolis, IN in 1861. 470 Due to mustering during an early
part of the war, the 17th was made up of men, “…not only representing every county in the State
and Twenty States of the Union, but had representatives from nearly every nation of Europe,” a
fact they were quite proud of. 471 By closer examination of the 17th’s roster from the war, we can
also make some observations about the heritage of the men in the unit.
The state of Indiana printed after the war a list of the men of all regiments and batteries
from Indiana. 472 One of the nuances that made analysis challenging was that while the officer
roles listed men in every position they held (some as many as 4 times) the enlisted roles only list
men in the position they originally held in the regiment, making it easier to navigate the enlisted
roll; officers who started as enlisted men appear on both roles. 473 After conducting a last name
analysis of the 17th IN 474, I was able to make several interesting observations. First, while the
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unit was primarily made of men with English/Welsh ancestry, they account for just under 60% of
the brigade. 475 Of the remaining 40% of the Regiment, the men come from all over Europe, with
sizable representation of Irish/Scottish and Germanic names. 476 In addition to this wide swath of
European heritage being represented, the numbers also reflect a rather even representation of all
groups between the officer and enlisted ranks, meaning that if a group made up 10% of the
enlisted ranks, they were likely to represent 10% of the officer slots as well. 477 While most
groups are equally represented in the officer and enlisted rolls, like the English/Welsh and
Germanic names, the Irish/Scottish as well as the French and Russian names are overrepresented; on the reverse of that, the Dutch are underrepresented in the officer rolls. 478 I
suspect this distribution is not based on any particular efforts on the part of the officers to limit
access to some groups and to ease the process for others. On the contrary, it would seem the men
had a very egalitarian system. Men who fought and were competent were promoted, no matter
what their background may have been.
In addition to analyzing the last names of the regiment, I conducted a survey of the socioeconomic background of the men of the 17th IN. 479 I surveyed 10% of the regiment, as the 17th
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IN had over 1900 men pass through it throughout the course of the war. The two major factors
analyzed were their jobs and the attributed wealth. 480 The largest challenge was finding
information on the men as listed on the muster roles. Some companies were very good about
listing hometowns/counties for their soldiers while others, particularly for recruits later in the
war, were not. While I was still able to locate some names that did not list a hometown, very
common names were impossible to locate due to an excess of age appropriate men from Indiana
during that time. 481 This made it so that just over half the men I had selected were not locatable
with the information provided. 482 Of those that I could locate, they proved to be a rather diverse
bunch. A majority of them did have professions related to Farm work, but there were almost 20
other professions of differing social station that rounded out the group. 483 484 Farmer proved to
be a misleading profession as some possessed very large holdings (according to the census),
while others had very small holdings or even none, suggesting some rented the land as tenants
and therefore couldn’t count it towards their wealth. The larger take away it that most of the men
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in the sample were working to middle class backgrounds, with two notable exceptions being the
Gentleman and the Merchant’s son in addition to several much larger farmers. In terms of
measurable wealth, the number analyzed are also interesting. A larger majority (60%) of the men
had no real estate wealth to speak of, but the average real estate wealth for the sample was
$674.18. 485 While many of the men claimed no real estate wealth, most of them could claim
some sort of personal wealth; the sample still had a large percentage (~34%) who claimed no
personal wealth, but the average for the sample was $281.16. 486 When combined, the total wealth
average comes to $1348.60, a misleading number as many of the soldiers possessed little to no
wealth and several large outliers move the number upwards. 487 If you remove the 6 individuals
who possessed either real estate or personal wealth far outlying the others, the average comes to
$889.98. 488 This was still a large amount for a regiment where many men held no wealth at all,
but still helps to evidence that the economic background of the men in the regiment was a
diverse as their heritage. In addition, the census data also shed light on the diverse origins, who
not only came from the adjacent states of Illinois, Kentucky and Ohio, but from Tennessee and
Pennsylvania. 489 The census records also indicate that several of the men were foreign born, with
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men from Canada, Prussia and Ireland amongst the sample. 490 Another Census record also lists
one soldier’s ethnicity as black, an unheard of rarity in a place like Indiana or anywhere in the
US at that time. 491 Though this shows a great deal of information about the 17th Indiana, it
indicates a large group of very different men. Although some of the men have similar
experiences, they are all very different in terms of their economic and social backgrounds. This
would further evidence that their strength and unity stemmed not from a brotherhood of Hoosier
farmhands, as some other units could perhaps claim, but rather a diverse group of men bound
together by the strength of their commander. This, along with their cosmopolitan social
background set the 17th IN apart from the other units in the Brigade.
The 72nd IN, for example, was recruited primarily around Lafayette, Indiana in 1862,
from counties of Tippecanoe, Carroll, Clinton, Boone, Montgomery, and Warren, which
surround Lafayette. 492 These counties were predominately rural at the time and made for a
regiment mostly of farmers. The 18th Indiana Battery was mustered in at Indianapolis in 1862.
Though a good number of the men came from around Crawfordville, IN, they were still a mixed
background unit. 493 The 92nd Illinois was mustered in at Rockford, IL in 1862 and made up of
“farmers and clerks” from the surrounding areas. 494 The 98th was mustered in Centralia in
Southern Illinois, also described as mostly farm boys, in 1862. 495 And finally the 123rd IL was
mustered in Mustoon, IL, in 1862, from Coles, Cumberland, Jasper and Clark counties, another
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very rural area where many of the company members were relations and suggested that it
allowed them to stand up to fire better than if they’d stood with strangers. 496 The professions of
these men were also predominately farmers and the area had been where Abraham Lincoln’s
family farm had been, where he’d practiced law, and where the Lincoln/Douglas debates had
occurred, making for a very pro-Lincoln regiment. 497 The unit also had a very low number of
foreigners in it (Union Army averaged 25%; the 123rd IL was 3%), and a larger presence of
Kentuckians and Tennesseans in the regiment. 498
This makes for a seemingly diverse grouping of men with little in common to explain
their excellent war performance, but that doesn’t tell the whole story about the Brigade. While
their demographics range from a true melting pot to the fiercely local, the one common
denominator was individual regiment cohesiveness. The more locally recruited units (72nd IN,
92nd IL, 98th IL, 123rd IL) were bound by kinship and local ties, while the more pluralistic units
(17th IN and 18th IN Battery) were tied together by tough discipline and shared suffering. It’s
easy for men to bond with people they know in the face of hardship, but it’s harder for strangers
to do and doesn’t always occur. The tough discipline associated with the 17th IN under Col.
Wilder and the “tyrannical” command of Capt. Lilly of the 18th Battery, forced them into a tight
bond, and, it could be argued, carried them through the war. 499 What else but tight unit cohesion
could explain why they fought with such drive and tenacity? While certainly their confidence
stemmed in part from their rather effective Spencer Repeating Rifles, there are many examples
of other units equipped with Spencers fleeing the field. 500 The men of the units themselves
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acknowledged this bond, but none more deeply than the 17th IN; in a publication for the 1913
17th Indiana Regimental Association meeting, they mention the sad parting from the 72nd IN, and
the “brotherly love” they felt between the two units, and for the 98th IL and 123rd IL, claiming
that no four regiments were closer. 501 While the men of the Lightning Brigade had no doubts
about the closeness of their bond, it can be claimed today that this bond is the best explanation of
their great successes. While it is good to be close and have good morale, the tactics used by the
Brigade certainly had a great hand in their success; more importantly they were tactics that they
had derived themselves.
XV. Contemporary Civil War Tactics vs. Wilder’s Tactics
Defining tactics during the Civil War can be a tricky undertaking, as the terms drill and
tactics are synonymous during that time period. Hardee’s Infantry and Rifle Tactics, for example,
is a drill book, discussing movement for groupings and training of men from companies on up to
divisions and beyond. 502 Detailed with regard to individual movements and facings, it devotes
only 4 pages to “street fighting”, really the only acknowledgement of non-standard combat and
essentially takes those several pages to tell commanders to stretch out their formations across the
lane. 503 These formations are all based on Napoleonic era theories, which themselves are based
around standing in lines, several ranks deep, and moving as regiments (smaller or larger groups
as a situation required) to attack the opposing force then to engage them with smoothbore musket
fire. 504 In the modern era, where you can be “drilled” in “tactics”, drill and tactics refer to two
completely different things, drill being there for discipline purposes and basic instruction,
whereas tactics are for accomplishing objectives. This kind of rigid “tactical” uniformity and
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actually rather simplistic combat approach from the Civil War simply wouldn’t work in the
dynamic combat environment of modern warfare, and as it turns out was one of the more
disastrous aspects of the Civil War. These Napoleonic era tactics, which were lifted verbatim
from French drill manuals rather than actually written in America, were “extremely costly” to
both sides during the war because the rifle-musket technology itself had made Napoleonic
precepts outdated, and yet they were utilized stubbornly long after the war. 505 But what would
they have done otherwise? This emphasis on French manuals by West Point instructors had
thoroughly ingrained all of Napoleon’s precepts in its graduates, and the timing of Hardee’s
Tactics in 1861 was deliberate so that Confederate officers would have it available for training,
meant it was the basis for all training due to it being institutional for all high level officers. 506
The most shocking aspect from this overarching drill system is what it was lacking:
firearms training. While there is debate about which side at the time was more accustomed to the
use of firearms, the formal use of live firing and range practice, let alone any official training
standards, simply didn’t exist at the time. 507 Drill with dry-firing was common but to actually
fire the rifle often didn’t happen until the first engagement. 508 While not expressly mentioned,
this probably has to do with the assumption in Napoleonic drill that it doesn’t matter how good
one man’s aim is because they fire as units in volleys. Therefore, it wasn’t so much an oversight
as a ridiculous notion that you would take the time to teach an individual to hit a target, since he
would have men on line with him firing at a line of men at the same time. The folly of this
probably reared its ugly head on more than one occasion, since dry-firing does nothing to prepare
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you for how a rifle will handle and you have to add in fear, stress, and the general bedlam around
you that the drill field simply doesn’t prepare you for. It is easy to imagine the result of an
engagement where a regiment of country boys who’ve been shooting their entire lives comes
across a regiment of city boys who, until joining the army, had never held a gun before; all the
braveries in the world won’t save a unit that can’t effectively engage the enemy in a stressful
situation. Despite its short-comings, the standard military mindset on-the-whole was utilized by
most infantry forces on both sides throughout the war and was standard training practice for all
units during the conflict. While there may have been certain drawbacks, experience was a fine
teacher and experience was easy to get. There are several factors that made Wilder’s Lightning
Brigade unique and not prone to all the same weaknesses. One was their Spencer Repeating
Rifles, easy to use and operate, and the other being that fact they weren’t simple infantry, they
were MOUNTED Infantry.
Cavalry tactics had their own methods of standardization, but most of the great
commanders learned it ‘in the saddle’ so to speak. While available to Wilder, like Hardee’s
Tactics, he would not have utilized cavalry manuals since they didn’t apply to him. Gen. Joseph
Wheeler’s Civil War era manual, “Revised system of Cavalry Tactics, For Use of the Cavalry
and Mounted Infantry”, is occasionally credited to having inspired Wilder to make his effort to
mount his Brigade. 509 There are however a few problems with that theory, the biggest being that
the book was published in 1863, the year Wilder’s Lightning Brigade was first entering the
scene. It would have been difficult for a copy of the book to influence Wilder because it had
been released early in the year. 510 To make its way through the lines and into Wilder’s hands
before June when the Battle of Hoover’s Gap occurred would have been difficult: It is also
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doubtful that the book was released early in the year since the book was published at the behest
and approval of the Confederate Congress which is alleged to have moved far slower than their
Union counterpart. 511 That said, Gen. Wheeler’s work is invaluable in trying to explain the
difference between cavalry and mounted infantry. Gen. Wheeler defines what “Mounted
Rifleman” were:
“In mounted rifle regiments the horses are principally used for the purpose of
promptly reaching the point of attack and such troops are almost invariably used in many
respects in a manner similar to light infantry. It becomes of great value in covering the
retreat of an army, or in obstructing the advance of the enemy; and in broken and wooded
countries, where light cavalry becomes almost useless, the mounted rifleman becomes
indispensable to an army. By having this arm associated with light cavalry and horse
artillery, the organization becomes complete for any enterprise. It is true these troops
when dismounted are inferior in compactness to infantry, but their rapid movements
enable them frequently to take the enemy by surprise and thus defeat him before he has
time to perfect his dispositions for defence.

It is of the first importance that mounted

rifleman should be taught to mount and dismount with rapidity and without confusion,
and that the horse-holders should understand thoroughly the management of horses, so as
to prevent their becoming frightened when their riders are fighting upon foot”. 512

I have yet to come across a more perfect description of what the Mounted Infantry were
supposed to be doing for the army, and Wheeler could claim to have been the first to put that in
print. His observations about the utility of “mounted rifleman” is a pointed one. America was not
Europe, and the terrain radically different then what Napoleon faced. The mentioned use of
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“light cavalry and horse artillery” is important because Wilder often had the 18th Indiana Battery
with him and Col. Minty with his cavalry brigade, which together would satisfy that supposed
requirement. 513 The weakness he cites, however, for this type of unit is important to note because
it doesn’t apply to Wilder’s brigade. The supposed lack of “compactness” and not having the
same hitting power as an infantry regiment was not a problem for the Lightning Brigade as they
carried repeating rifles, making them a very “compact” force. 514 It is at this point that we get into
what made Wilder’s Mounted Infantry so different from their northern counterparts.
The infantry regiments making up the Lightning Brigade all had a lot in common with
their “Creative Commander”, Col. Wilder. 515 Their “many marks of singularity” are the reasons
they were so different from other units. 516 The general attitude of the men was a huge factor in
their successes, equipped with the best rifles available, riding into battle but ditching the horses
to fight toe-to-toe with the South’s crack brigades of fighters. The general confidence, both in
themselves and in Wilder, stemmed from their mounts and rifles, but their leadership was what
made them successful. As one author writes, “Wilder’s intelligence, imagination, mechanical
knowledge and topographical intuition were revealed in the activities of the Brigade,” giving him
a near super-human reputation with the men under his command. 517 But while confidence is a
good thing, it alone does not guarantee victory, as many a valiant regiment learned during
Pickett’s Charge at Gettysburg. What was important was the way they undertook combat, the
tactics that they adopted in battle that led to their stunning victories and shining achievements.
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While no official unit strategy guide survives (not that there is any evidence to suggest
one ever existed), you can glean standard practices from the actions of the brigade under fire.
While they may have discussed such matters with Brigade staff prior to using them in the field,
they appear to be mostly “Ad Hoc”, adapted on their own to meet situations as they arose, much
like their initial mounting. Military historian Joseph Bilby notes: “Like men armed with Henrys,
Spencer-armed soldiers developed ad-hoc local tactics. The effectiveness of these tactics
depended on the creativity of small unit leaders and were never committed to doctrine”. 518 This
is a position that would be in agreement with Military Historian Jay Luvaas, who states, “It was a
war of improvisation”. 519 That lateral thinking led Wilder to the conclusion that would spawn the
unit’s tactical theories, and it had everything to do with mounting, and of course weapons
technology and “combat leadership”. 520 Wilder was also known for his emphasis on selfsufficiency, salvaging wrecks from the side of the road and rebuilding them to haul Brigade
supplies, and as a “Strict Disciplinarian”, branding and marching before the Brigade a
deserter. 521 Keeping a tight rein of the Brigade while still allowing for the outlet that selfsufficiency demands, Wilder would have been able to drill the men hard and expect them to
perform to the standard that was essential to a unit like theirs: speed.
The ability to move in rapidly and often take the enemy by surprise is an old military
lesson but one the Lightning Brigade learned early and practiced often during the war.
Anticipating this, Capt. Lilly of the 18th Indiana Battery acquired two “mountain howitzers” for
the express reason that they could be moved into position quickly and easily to keep pace with
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the fast-moving mounted infantry regiments of the Lightning Brigade. 522 Often battery command
decisions were delegated to the commander of whatever infantry commander they happened to
be assigned to, leading to ineffectiveness and poor advancement prospects for officers attached
to batteries. 523 However, due to the close working relationship that Wilder and Lilly had, this
was never a problem while the 18th Battery was attached to the Wilder Brigade, allowing them to
deliver rapid and precise support that the brigade required. This speed was the key factor for the
brigade in many of their engagements, including their two most famous, the Battle of Hoover’s
Gap and Chickamauga.
The Battle of Hoover’s Gap is easily the best example of Lightning Brigade tactics, for
several reasons, but the most obvious was the circumstances of the fight. They had picked the
time of their fight and were on the offensive, surprising the enemy and then stopping to hold the
objective. Otto McManus described the action: “The farther they went the larger the rebel force
of cavalry kept growing before them, but the rapid pace gave the enemy no time to form, until
about 9 o’clock in the morning, by which time these two regiments had advanced to and seized
Hoover’s Gap, a place of great natural strength…” 524 Every description has similar language of
the early battle: “swept them aside,” “rode through”, “drove pickets rapidly”, “quickly pushed
off”, “overran”, and “quickly dislodged” when referring to the rebel forces, describing an initial
scene much closer to a rout than a battle. 525 This kind of action is in line with what military
historian Paddy Griffith terms, “Shock Tactics”: they require highly disciplined command or
high quality troops, and involve more rapid, even brazen, attacks that are higher risk but can

Baumgartner, Blue Lightning, 51-52, and Bilby, A Revolution in Arms, 103.
Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War, 165.
524
McManus, Morning to Midnight in the Saddle, 81-82.
525
Baumgartner, Blue Lightning, 88, Cozzens, This Terrible Sound, 18, McQueen, Spencer, 45 Rowell, Yankee
Artillerymen, 77, Sunderland, Lightning at Hoover’s Gap, 39, and Woodworth, Six Armies in Tennessee, 22.
522
523

110

potentially produce high “dividends” if successful. 526 With tough disciplinarians like Col. Wilder
in charge, you had tough, determined leadership and men of high quality, that quality already
raised by their superior weapons and beneficial mounting. What came next was also telling about
the Brigades “tactics” or at least their command style. Wilder is cited as repositioning his men to
face the developing threats, supporting the guns and having a reserve to back up his other
forces. 527 Capt. Lilly had enough sense (and leeway) to deploy the sections of his battery where
they were needed to support the regiments of the Brigade. 528 Wilder was able to quickly respond
to threats with his hands-on leadership style and hold the Gap until relief reached them. His firm
grasp of enfilading fire and artillery support wreaked havoc on the rebel forces. While not ever
mentioned as being expressly discussed by members of the Brigade, this style of combat, rapid
assault and stubborn defenses, became emblematic of Lightning Brigade combat. The other great
example of this “style” of combat would be the most famous battle due to its infamy on the
Union side, Chickamauga.
While Chickamauga is recorded as a 2-day affair in most history books, the battle was a
3-day slugfest for the Lightning Brigade that would see them forestalling disaster at every turn.
The first day’s action found them defending a series of fords and crossings around Alexander’s
Bridge, an action that was later described as “stubborn” defense and a “valiant stand”; their
withdrawal later was forced (and in good order) and occurred only after they had delayed an
attempt at crossing for several hours. 529 This “close and brilliant” fighting was just that, very
closely engaged and well executed; Wilder was deliberate in positioning his forces, but not
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restrictive of their movements, as members of Co. A 72nd IN had the good sense to build a
“Lunette” (small fort) out of the planks they’d ripped off the bridge. 530 The opening day of
Chickamauga was an example of another tenacious defense with an actively engaged
commander, who even had the good sense to destroy the bridge behind the brigade as they
retreated, yet there was still a lot of battle to be fought. 531 The 19th of September found the
brigade holding a tree line west of Vinard Field facing across LaFayette Road; the rebels
attacked in the morning only to discover to their shock that not only was Wilder’s Brigade dug in
with breastworks, but repulsed them with heavy fire. 532 The day again saw success for the
Lightning Brigade, who had repeatedly driven off the approaching Confederate forces, yet the
Union forces tried to press the attack only for their attacks to get thrown back. 533 The Rebels
attacked again, forcing the Lightning Brigade to once again repulse them. 534 Historian Peter
Cozzens describes this method as Wilder acting as a “Tactical Reserve”, responding to holes in
the assault and countering flanking efforts, which led to much “charge-and-counter-charge”
action made possible by their rapid movements and heavy firepower made available by the
Spencer. 535 This would fall under the mantra of rapid assaults and stubborn holding actions, by
stopping an advance, and then sending the enemy fleeing back across the road with bold charges.
The final day of battle saw some of the most daring efforts thus far though the ultimate effort
(the assault on Longstreet’s rear) was not attempted. The 20th of September nearly saw the Union
army routed due to a grave error on the part of the Gen. Rosecrans as a gap was left in
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repositioning of forces which allowed the Rebels to spilt the Union force, scattering all forces
part of the right wing of the army, save for Wilder’s Brigade. 536 Another Brigade, under
Brigadier General William Haines Lytle, attempted to make a stand also. 537 Gen. Lytle was
killed, the unit engulfed and then routed just as Wilder came crashing into the enemy flank and
rear. 538 Wilder’s Lightning Brigade proceeded to “charge in” and send the rebels under Gen.
Manigault fleeing for their lives a mile up the road before the Brigade halted their pursuit. 539
Otho McManus later described the scene and seeing his brother’s unit routed: “This would not
do---so with a yell, the Brigade dashed into the woods at a double-quick and opened on them
with the Spencers at such a rate that they instantly broke and such a rebel skedaddling I never
saw before; and I have seen several stampedes of rebs”. 540 The Brigade was described as,
“causing great destruction of life, and driving Manigault’s Brigade in disorder back to the
Lafayette Road,” and acting as, “an island of controlled firepower in the midst of disaster”. 541
Once again, bold “shock tactics” that involved charges with heavy weapons fire available to
Spencer equipped troops, and holding position if attacked, were highly successful, all due to the
hands-on approach Wilder practiced.
While later battles would continue the tactical habits of the Lightning Brigade, the
question arises whether or not their successes have to do with Wilder’s presence or not. It can be
noted that the Brigade continued their bold charges and stubborn defenses as the actions at the
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Battle of Farmington and the Battle of Selma can attest, 542 but it could be argues it’s because the
Brigade stayed together and was led by a Wilder protégé. I would then draw attention to the 92nd
IL, who served so briefly with the Lightning Brigade and at the time were not all equipped with
Spencer Repeating Rifles, meaning they feasibly wouldn’t have necessarily acted in the same
manner as the rest of the Brigade. 543 Their first outing with the Lightning Brigade in August of
1863 was very nearly a disaster, as they were stalled by an enemy force, forcing the 72nd IN to
step in and show the “greenhorns” how it was done. 544 However, by the time of Chickamauga
the 92nd IL had learned their lesson; they attacked the enemy on the 19th of September and
“easily” pushed them back before being forced to withdraw, a more confident and decisive unit
than they had been a month before. 545 But even after they had departed the Brigade for other
commands, they held onto their lessons. In May of 1864, long having departed the brigade, the
92nd was ordered by General Hugh Judson “Kill-Cavalry” Kilpatrick to take a fortified
position. 546 Having already made clear his skepticism of both their weapons and ability to make
the attack, he ordered them in. 547 They attacked and easily took the difficult target, keeping the
rebels pinned down with their rapid-fire Spencer repeaters all the way to the objective,
impressing the now won over Kilpatrick with their novel weapons. 548 This demonstration
remains proof that the lessons of the Brigade stuck with all who fought with them, and all those
willing to be flexible with their efforts. Their actions were apparently so successful that General
Kilpatrick became a strong proponent of the Spencer’s utility for the rest of the war. 549 The men
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of the 92nd IL were properly instructed in the applications of the Spencer Repeaters, something
their commander, Col. Atkins, couldn’t help but comment on: “From the moment that Wilder
demonstrated that men could be transported on horse-back rapidly to the important point of
military operations in the field and under fire, and could be dismounted instantly and fight on
foot with the coolness, steadiness, and bravery of the oldest and best drilled infantry, the cavalry
of the army was a byword”. 550 While it may have seemed at the time that this was the case, the
advances they had discovered didn’t eliminate old-style cavalry, nor were these stirrings of
modern “mechanized infantry” adopted in their entirety.
XVI. Long Term Effects on Warfare
Author Glenn Sunderland confidently states of the Lightning Brigade when discussing
the forming of the unit, “Now they were together---the brigade that was to set the pattern for
modern mounted warfare, and their able ingenious leader” (emphasis added). 551 But could have
they really achieved this? In their own time, particularly during the Civil War, the tactics used by
the Lightning Brigade that were passed onto the 92nd IL, influenced Gen. Kilpatrick and led to
the claim that the Spencer was, “…very useful, even critical, to Union tactical success on
occasion during the Atlanta campaign, and they were soon in action during the ‘March to the
Sea’”. 552 Despite this utility and effective use of the Spencer, wide-scale adoption was not to be.
While ordinance and strategy officers agreed that carbine repeaters were useful to cavalry units
and that they were already issuing them to infantry units, the War Department opted to begin
issuing their infantry units’ single-shot breechloaders after the war. 553
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While they may have been assisting in making the war shorter, the repeating rifle’s new
and evolving doctrine had not “solidified” enough by the war’s end to be adopted fully into
military strategy. 554 It could be argued repeating rifles were a bold leap forward for military
technology, which meant little to a bureaucracy that preferred timid steps. Surely though, the
new technology must have had an effect on military drill manuals and tactics due to the radical
departure from Napoleonic tradition and obvious failure of these old tactics, but it was not so.
Emory Upton’s new manual (published and approved 1867), “A New System of infantry Tactics,
double and single rank; adapted to American Topography and improved fire-arms,” departs very
little from Hardee’s manual, moving around some sections but remaining essentially the same,
but there are several small differences that are key. 555 Upton does add in a section about loading
a “Springfield breech-loader” after its section on rifle loading and firing commands. 556 The other
is at the very beginning in the ‘introduction’ to the manual, where it states the text, “That it
provides for a single-rank formation, specially adapted to the use of breech-loaders”. 557 While a
seemingly minor addition, and certainly not confirmation that the Lightning Brigade specifically
was in mind, it proves that the effort of units like Wilder’s Brigade had forced an
acknowledgement of the changing of the times. Unfortunately, the idea of giving standard
infantry units rapid-fire repeaters did not breech the bureaucracy, nor did the novel idea of
having men ride into battle atop mounts. The Army went so far as to include a passage at the
beginning of the manual that states: “To insure uniformity throughout the Army, all infantry
exercises and manoeuvers not embraced in that system are prohibited, and those therein
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prescribed will be strictly observed”. 558 The Army was willing to make some changes, but still
rigidly hold to the old methods. Military historian Paddy Griffith aptly points out that while
Upton is “different” from the European models, he is still very much rooted in the past. 559 While
the men of the Lightning Brigade had demonstrated new possibilities and tactics for the new
technology, the age old problem of the military “always wanting to fight the last war” kept the
changes from being adopted at the time. But how did this influence shape up outside of the US
and in future military tactics?
Author Glenn Sunderland discusses the “modern cavalry principles developed by the
Lightning Brigade” at the end of his work on the famous unit. 560 While it is no stretch to assign
labels to the Brigade’s actions, such as precursor to Blitzkrieg or Mechanized Infantry, there is
no direct correlation to prove this. The most scathing fact to support this is the refusal of the
European militaries to learn from the American experiences of the Civil War. While well
observed, militaries often looked only at particular facets that supported their own styles of
warfare (for example, the Germans were very interested in rail transport), but most dismissed the
war on the whole, particularly in some cases the Spencer and/or the concept of mounted infantry,
in a negative light. 561 While many such changes caught on later, or were reexamined to combat
perceived weaknesses in their existing strategies, often they had to learn such lessons for
themselves on the battlefield. 562 One later conclusion about the Civil War was, “…that the
mounted infantry of the Civil War, might well be the parent rather than a bastard offspring of
modern cavalry”. 563 Unfortunately, the Brigade does not figure into this conclusion as Gen.
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Sheridan, the man the Lightning Brigade jeered as he was quickly swept from the field at
Chickamauga 564, received credit for mounted infantry tactics because his actions were in the
East, where most of the observers were and where most publications described leading up to the
Great War (World War I). 565 While many of the tougher lessons of the Civil War, such as
attacking trenches and use of modern technology, were not readily studied or adjusted for, this
doesn’t change the fact that the Civil War was a good source of information on how the
Napoleonic conditions and mindset was being left behind by technology and needed
replacement, and how the American experience was not an “oddity” but a warning of things to
come. 566 While it cannot definitively proven that Wilder’s Lightning Brigade was responsible
for the eventual use of mechanized infantry concepts, their lessons were there in the annals of
history to be learned later and applied to new and emerging challenges of the 20th Century.
XVII. Conclusion
When the Civil War ended in April of 1865, the Lightning Brigade and its component
regiments humbly returned home. True citizen-soldiers, they marched home in honor and simply
went back to their civilian lives, none seeming to have a desire to remain in uniform. While these
men may have completed their military service, they still met regularly amongst their various
regimental associations, and as the Lightning Brigade, due to the strong bonds they had forged
during the war, and reminisced about their many accomplishments. Wilder’s Lightning Brigade
successfully created a new method of warfare, unbound by existing doctrine and modifying their
tactics based on their surroundings and tools at hand. This deliberate alteration was highly
effective in an era where repeating rifles were still a novelty or oddity, allowing for devastating
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actions and rapid advances due to their mounting on horseback. Their efforts with mounting the
Brigade and equipping it with Spencer Repeating Rifles, and the tactics it spawned, were so
effective that not only did they earn the attention and praise of their fellow soldiers, but also
soldiers on the other side. While they were on the cusp of greatness with their efforts, their
advances and strides in mounted combat fell to the wayside with the war’s end, hard fought
lessons simply being forgotten. While the achievements of the Lightning Brigade were forgotten
outside of the surviving members of the unit and those they had faced, the concept of a rapidly
moving and mobile “mounted” force equipped well and able to engage the enemy on foot
continued to be examined in later conflicts and often used effectively. While it would not be fair
to claim that the Lightning Brigade was the inspiration for Blitzkrieg or modern Mechanized
Infantry forces, they do stand as a positive example of the concept long before it was officially
institutionalized in military doctrines. While the Lightning Brigade’s members and supporters
may have been a bit boisterous when they claimed that the Lightning Brigade pioneered the
concept of mounted infantry that the Army later embraced, they can confidently claim that they
effectively demonstrated the value of a new technology and demonstrated the value of ingenuity
when it comes to tackling a problem. Wilder and his Lightning Brigade faced an issue of having
to chase cavalry on foot, an issue they found a solution for. In the end, they can confidently
claim they solved the problem with any and all means at their disposal. The Lightning Brigade
will always be remembered as the men who tackled the problems that faced them, and should be
remembered as being instrumental in counteracting the Rebel cavalry menace for the remainder
of the conflict.
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